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A PRESCRIPTION TO RETIRE
THE RHETORIC OF “PRINCIPLES-BASED SYSTEMS” IN
CORPORATE LAW, SECURITIES REGULATION AND ACCOUNTING
Lawrence A. Cunningham *
60 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW ___ (Oct.-Nov. 2007)
Abstract
This Article corrects widespread misconception about whether complex
regulatory systems can be fairly described as either “rules-based” or “principles-based”
(also called “standards-based”). Promiscuous use of these labels has proliferated in the
years since the implosion of Enron Corp., with users exhibiting an increasing habit of
celebrating systems dubbed principles-based and scorning those called rules-based.
While the concepts of rules and principles (or standards) are useful to classify individual
provisions, they are not scalable to the level of complex regulatory systems. The Article
uses examples from corporate law, securities regulation and accounting to illustrate this
problematic phenomenon. To describe or design systems as principles-based or rulesbased, analysis must account for the application and interaction of all provisions. Once
these features are accounted for, the labels become facile. The Article thus concludes
that it is neither possible nor desirable to fashion such systems to be “principles-based”
or “rules-based” and that such misleading labels should be retired.
The Article then explores why the rhetoric extolling “principles-based systems” is
flourishing. It considers three hypotheses: (1) a regulatory emphasis on discretionary
enforcement to induce cautious compliance, (2) a quest to rejuvenate ethical principles in
the practice of corporate law, securities regulation and accounting and (3) a deflective
political strategy in jurisdictional competition to signal product differentiation. The first
and second hypotheses are credible but suffer from both descriptive and normative
weaknesses, including how they can backfire by leading to overzealous enforcement. The
third is the strongest descriptively but is most troubling normatively. Political effort to
differentiate regulatory products using these labels is a form of misleading advertising.
This deflection not only underscores the need to retire these labels, it also reveals a
routinely overlooked limitation of jurisdictional competition in corporate law, securities
regulation and accounting.
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INTRODUCTION
Many people seem to believe that legal or accounting systems can be either
“rules-based” or “principles-based.”1 The numerous debacles epitomized by Enron Corp.
drew worldwide attention to these labels. Many attributed the debacles to weaknesses in
the United States accounting system, which they classified as “rules-based.” 2 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to study
this claim. 3 Within and outside the United States, policymakers seize on these categories
to self-classify their legal and accounting systems and use these labels as grounds for
promotion, reform or prescription. 4 This Article contends that this regulatory enthusiasm
for analysis positioned across the rules/principles axis is misplaced.
These classifications are too crude to describe or guide the design of corporate
law, securities regulation or accounting systems. Inquiry concerning the nature of rules
and principles demonstrates how these labels invariably require sorting individual legal
or accounting provisions onto a continuum rather than precisely fitting them into the
categories. Describing a system as principles-based or rules-based would require not
only an inventory of all its provisions along that continuum but also account for how they
are applied and how they interact. Within large complex regulatory systems, assessment
of the application and interaction of individual provisions may result in systemic qualities
that differ significantly from one based on an inventory of the individual provisions.
Moreover, a conscious effort to design a system to be either principles-based or rulesbased would require forcing individual provisions toward the poles. To do so interferes
1

The phrase “standards-based system” is also used. See infra text accompanying notes ___-___.
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E.g., HARVEY PITT, SEC CHAIRMAN, TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING
AND URBAN AFFAIRS (asserting that US accounting is “based on rules, and not on broad principles”); FIN.
ACCT. STANDARDS BD.: PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO U.S. STANDARD SETTING, NO. 107205 (Oct.
2002); SENATE REPORT NO. 107-205, at 13 (2002); see Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets,
Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 421 (2004); William H. Widen, Enron at the
Margin, 58 BUS. LAW. 961, 965 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1408-09 (2002); Stephen C. Gara & Craig J. Langstraat, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A New Ballgame for Accountants, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 93-94 (2003);
Anthony J. [sic], Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting
Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 161-62 (2003).
3

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 108(d), 15 U.S.C. § 7266; see infra text accompanying notes ___-___.
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See, e.g., Cathy Quinn, Corporate Governance (Speech) (July 8, 2005) (New Zealand Securities
Commissioner advertising the country’s “robust principles-based framework for good corporate
governance” instead of a “more prescriptive rules-based approach”); Irish Financial Regulator (Rialtir
Airgeadais) (Speech), Institute of European Affairs, Fin. Services Reg. (June 21, 2005) (“We are a
principles-based regulator” and oppose “rules-based systems”); Irish Financial Regulator (Rialtoir
Airgeadais) Annual Report 9 & 18 (2004) (same); Nicholas Le Pan, Financial Regulatory Outlook, 23
CANADIAN NAT’L BANKING L. REV. 52 (Dec. 2004) (describing approach to corporate governance
regulation as focused on behaviors addressed through “guidelines” that “are not rules,” including “such as
boards making sure they have the information they need in the form they need it”).
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with the benefits of the relationship among rules and principles and impairs tailoring the
form of articulation to meet desired objectives.
Surveys of US corporate law and securities regulation and of US and international
accounting illustrate the necessity and value of combining rules and principles and the
difficulty of designing systems warranting classification as rules-based or principlesbased. All these systems contain a blend of provisions ranging from the particular to the
general, from those providing precise ex ante instruction to those defined after the fact.
The provisions serve different ends and, because within large complex systems they are
not isolated from one another, they are mutually informative. Thus, corporate fiduciary
duty laws bear principles-like attributes but interact with individual statutes and, through
repeated applications in non-statutory contexts, they form a doctrinal structure bearing
rule-like attributes. Anti-fraud principles in securities regulation and measurement
principles in accounting interact with individual rules requiring specific disclosures and
classifications to produce a coherent body of legal and accounting provisions.
Yet global rhetoric increasingly speaks of the availability of systems denominated
as principles-based. As countries develop corporate laws, debate centers on whether they
should be formulated as rules-based or principles-based. 5 US federal securities
regulation is routinely criticized as rules-based, while the Canadian system is heralded as
principles-based. 6 Across the globe, many characterize the US accounting system as
rules-based while calling the international accounting system principles-based. 7 Within
the US, regulators and compliers alike invoke such language when campaigning for
favored provisions 8 or championing state versus federal primacy in regulating public
5

See, e.g., South Africa Corporate Governance Code (2002) (“principles-based” not rules-based and
“encourages directors to perform in the spirit of the code rather than simply applying the tick box
approach”); Thailand Stock Exchange, The Principles of Good Corporate Governance for Listed
Companies (March 2006) (11-page statement of principles and best practices, none of which is binding).
The Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada commissioned a study from me which
initially asked which is superior, a rules-based or principles-based system of securities regulation, and
ultimately involved elucidating some of the main characteristics of securities regulation in the United States
and Canada. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Principles and Rules in Public and Professional Securities
Law Enforcement: A Comparative US-Canada Inquiry (May 31, 2006).
6

E.g., Ruth O. Kuras, Harmonization of Securities Regulation Standards between Canada and the US, 81
U. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 465, 472 (2004); Allison Dabbs Garrett, Themes and Variations: The
Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices in Major World Markets, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
137, 161 (2004)
7

See Frederick Gill, Principles-Based Accounting Principles, 28 N. C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 967
(2003); see also Matthew A. Melone, US Accounting Standards: Rules or Principles? The Devil Is Not in
the Details, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1161 (2004); Hervé Stolowy, Nothing Like the Enron Affair Could
Happen in France!, 14 EURO. ACCT. REV. 405 (2005) (reviewing responses to Enron debacle among
French accounting scholars, practitioners and policymakers); Kenneth Yong, Exploring Rules-Based and
Principles-Based Accounting, ACCT. TODAY (Nov. 2004), p. 32 (international accounting is “popularly
considered as being principles-based” while US GAAP is “branded with a rules-based reputation”).
8

See, e.g., Piper Rudnik, Report on SEC Proposal on Executive Compensation (calling it less rules-based
and more principles-based, meaning disclosing all material items, whether or not they fit squarely within a
box of specific rules); Cynthia A. Glassman, (Speech), Tenth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute: Priorities
4

corporations. 9
Overwhelmingly, rhetoric vaunts “principles-based systems” and
denigrates “rules-based systems.”
Why this enthusiasm for principles-based systems, even though delivering them is
improbable? The Article explores three possible hypotheses. One possibility, the
regulatory hypothesis, is to provide a counterweight to strong systemic forces that
demand and produce provisions bearing rule-like characteristics. This response expands
enforcement arsenals and thus can elicit more cautious compliance. While this
explanation for the language is credible, four limitations appear—two that question its
normative desirability and two its descriptive accuracy.
Normatively, this strategy can induce excessively cautious compliance outlooks
that impair the benefits of rules and backfire as unfair or illegitimate if enforcement is
biased towards principles without sufficient regulatory guidance in rules. Descriptively,
the hypothesis is weak because the demand for rules always is offset by regulatory use of
principles to fortify enforcement arsenals and the rhetoric does not speak of a balance of
principles and rules but trumpets “principles-based systems” and denigrates “rules-based
systems.”
A second possibility, the ethical hypothesis, is that the pro-principles rhetoric
reflects desire to promote ethical values rather than expressing concern for the form of
articulated legal and accounting provisions. What the Enron-type debacles showed was
not so much the dangers of rules but manifest violation of a different set of principles
addressed by business and professional ethics. This interpretation suggests that the
language is ultimately a call for policymakers to emphasize those ethics, and targeted
actors to abide them. While also credible, two qualifications appear, one normative, one
descriptive.
Descriptively, such a call to ethical rejuvenation implicitly assumes a decline in
ethics during the relevant period, which may or may not be justified. Normatively, this
strategy could backfire too. Exhortations to abide the spirit of laws project a moral
appeal that may be desirable. But rhetorical stories of principles-based systems could
produce belief that rules can be subordinated or eliminated which, ensuing analysis
suggests, is neither possible nor wise.
A third possibility, the political hypothesis, views proponents of principles-based
systems as attempting to signal product differentiation in jurisdictional competitions
designed to maintain or expand authority. This is the most convincing explanation as a
descriptive matter. Under this account, Delaware judges promote their state’s corporate
law as principles-based to forestall increased federal regulation, which they criticize as
and Concerns at the SEC (March 9, 2006) (SEC Commissioner reporting her effort in 2003 to make
management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) disclosure less obscure by adopting an SEC “interpretive
release that provided principles-based guidance to help get MD&A back on point”).
9

See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the
Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1 (2005).
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rules-based; British Columbia advances a principles-based system to challenge Ontario’s
dominance in Canadian securities regulation; countries that say they offer principlesbased systems signal that they are mature enough to honor principles without the need for
detailed rules; and international accounting promulgators promote their product as
principles-based against US GAAP, which they rebuke as rules-based, to gain leadership
in establishing the global accounting system.
Although the political hypothesis is descriptively appealing, it is normatively
troubling. If it is impossible to devise “principles-based systems,” then promoting them
is misleading. In addition to how this undermines the hortatory aspirations of the ethical
hypothesis, it exposes a negative by-product of the jurisdictional competition that results
in such linguistic overstatement. This potential for misleading rhetoric has been
overlooked in the literature concerning jurisdictional competition. Explicitly recognizing
it not only supports retiring the misleading labels, it identifies a new limitation on the
efficacy of jurisdictional competition.
To reach these conclusions, the Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I reviews the
literature on rules and principles, showing considerable struggles concerning matters of
classification and trade-offs as well as of labeling. Extending this literature from
individual provisions to entire systems, discussion justifies skepticism about whether it is
feasible to describe or design such system as “principles-based” or “rules-based.”
Part II focuses on corporate law, securities regulation and accounting. It first
surveys major substantive provisions in these fields to demonstrate the presence of a
range of provisions, from rules to principles, whose application and interaction frustrates
simplistic characterization of the systems as rules-based or principles-based. It then
reviews proposed system designs that illustrate how even conscious efforts to avoid
having an interactive mixture of provisions do not succeed.
Part III considers three possible explanations for the fashionable rhetoric extolling
principles-based systems in corporate law, securities regulation and accounting. It
explores the hypotheses that attribute this phenomenon to promoting regulatory
capabilities or ethical values and summarizes their descriptive and normative weaknesses.
Analysis of the hypothesis that political factors explain the phenomenon is shown to be
the most descriptively accurate but normatively most troubling. In addition to adding a
reason to doubt the virtue of jurisdictional competition, this cements the case to retire as
misleading the labels “rules-based” and “principles-based” to describe legal or
accounting systems.
I. THE DYNAMICS OF RULES AND PRINCIPLES
Rules and principles are individual forms of articulation constituting components
of larger regulatory systems that, in varying degrees, enable regulators to communicate
expectations and provide people with guidance about what is required or permitted.
Legal scholars continually struggle to delineate the categories of individual rules and
principles and assess their relative merits. The difficulties associated with the treatment
of individual provisions multiply when attempting to analyze the characteristics of the
6

larger complex regulatory systems of which the individual provisions are fragments.
This Part reviews some of the extensive literature, taking the analysis as evidence that it
is impossible and undesirable to design a system fairly characterized as principles-based
or rules-based.
A. Treatment of Individual Provisions
The following sub-sections discuss the literature concerning treatment of
individual provisions as rules and principles. Analysis suggests that rules and principles
are best conceived as residing along a continuum according to a provisions’ relative
vagueness and posing subtle trade-offs. The ensuing section shows that the difficulties of
treating individual provisions multiply when addressing large complex regulatory
systems.
1. Labels — A preliminary difficulty in the literature concerning rules and
principles concerns labels which, many scholars observe, are fraught with ambiguity and
confusion. 10 Scholars often invoke a simple polarity concerning driving regulations to
illustrate two alternative expressions of a legal or accounting provision. One formulation
provides specific directives defined ex ante (such as a 55 mph speed limit) while another
provides general directives whose specific content is defined ex post (such as to drive at a
reasonable rate of speed). Scholars assign different labels to such illustrations.
The first formulation invariably is called a rule and the second often is called a
standard. Some legal scholars use the term principle while others use the word
standard 11 or use them interchangeably. 12 Some use the term principle to denominate the
animating purpose of a stated rule. In turn, some scholars use the word standards to
capture both rules and principles so understood. 13 Others reserve the label principles for
the different idea of background justifications for laws or other commands (whether
rules, standards or something else). Increasingly, analysts use the label standards to
denote a measure of performance or conduct, often established by non-governmental
organizations (as in Internet standards or credit rating standards). 14
10

See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-59, n. 231 (1992); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 379, at n. 16 (1985); Louis Kaplow, Rules and Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 559 at n. 2 (1992).
11

See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22-25 (1967); RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 22-28, 71-80 (1977); John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of
Legal Certainty, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 47, at n. 2 (2002).
12

See Sullivan, supra note ___, at 58 n. 231 (citing Professors Dworkin, Schauer and Radin); see also
Kaplow, supra note ___, at 559 at n. 2 (noting that “Outside the debate over formulation of the law, the
terms are often used interchangeably”).
13

This is the dominant approach in the accounting literature. See Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on
the Effects of Principles- and Rules-Based Standards, 17 ACCT. REV. 91 (2003).
14

See Symposium, Owning Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2007).
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The discordant labels also emerge in practice. Corporate law’s “business
judgment rule” can be seen as a broad principle—a judicial presumption that corporate
officials act with due care. In the US, the shorthand reference of “Rule 10b-5” is
invariably used to designate securities regulation’s most vague and open-ended anti-fraud
principles. Accounting terminology offers GAAP (generally accepted accounting
principles) and GAAS (generally accepted auditing standards), both of which contain a
mixture of provisions fairly denominated as rules, principles or standards.
The proliferation of contradictory labels may simply suggest that such labels
mean little. Indeed, some dismiss the confusion that the stew creates in legal theory as
mere nominalism, which does not impair analysis. 15 However, it is possible that the
disagreement on labeling reveals something more substantive about these ideas and how
useful they are as analytical tools. One possibility is that the categories are inevitably
unstable. As discussed below, this instability supports conceiving of the content in the
categories (rules, principles, standards) as residing on a continuum across which
provisions operate iteratively, meaning that their substantive meaning is mutually
informative.
For now, the question of terms in legal and accounting theory requires authors to
state vocabulary choices at the outset of any analysis. As a contrast to rules, I will use
the term principles, in part, because that is the commonly used term in contemporary
rhetoric and this, in turn, suggests that something more is at stake in labeling than many
suppose. 16 I also choose the word principles rather than standards to reflect how the
latter term increasingly is used to designate performance or conduct measures, not legal
provisions that are contrasted with rules.
2. Classification — A more important difficulty is the problem of classifying
given provisions as rules or principles. The common illustration from driving regulations
(the rule of 55 mph versus the principle of reasonableness) is easy but incomplete. The
following notes three classification methodologies—what I call analytical, conceptual
and functional—and concludes by suggesting that these are united by the single quality of
a provision’s relative vagueness.
A common analytical approach to classifying laws as rules or principles uses their
temporal orientation. It distinguishes when content is provided: rules define boundaries
ex ante while principles define them ex post. 17 In securities regulation, brokers know
that they are not allowed to make unauthorized trades for clients (a rule) but may not
know whether other behavior exhibits commercial honor until it is evaluated after the fact
(a principle). Thus rules and principles are sometimes classified according to how much
15

Braithwaite, A Theory of Legal Certainty, supra note ___, at n.2.

16

See infra text accompanying notes ___-___ (discussing how rhetoric promoting principles-based legal
and accounting systems may be related to promoting principles of business ethics).

17

See Kaplow, supra note ___.
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guidance they provide to actors ex ante—how much certainty is provided. Notably, in
this view, both rules and principles can be either complex or simple.
A weakness of the temporal classification is that the expression of any legal
provision is always ex ante whereas its application is always ex post. To that extent, the
method only distinguishes articulations according to whether one has been applied or not.
Put differently, the temporal classification carries an implicit assumption that an
articulated provision can determine its future application, which it cannot. 18 True, the
circumstances in which such resulting uncertainty arises may be few or yield only modest
uncertainty. Still, the tool does not enable completely classifying all provisions into
discrete categories of rule and principle. Instead, provisions offer varying degrees of
certainty and thus array across a spectrum from rule-like to principle-like.
A more conceptual classification views rules and principles in terms of designated
attributes such as their relative generality versus specificity, abstractness versus
concreteness and universality versus particularity.
Provisions characterized by
generality, abstractness or universality are principles while those being specific, concrete
and particular are rules. Provisions bearing a mix of these attributes are more or less
principles-like or rules-like. Thus, as examples, a provision that is general and abstract
but not universal is principle-like while a provision that is specific and particular but
abstract is rule-like. Sub-qualities bearing on these attributes include the extent of a
provision’s clarification, detail, exceptions or limitations.
In securities regulation, the directive to exhibit “commercial honor” is a principle
because it is general, abstract and universal. 19 A broker’s duty to warn customers of the
hazards of penny stock investment vehicles is a rule because it is specific, concrete and
particular. 20 A directive that companies disclose information “on a rapid and current
basis” is principle-like because it is general and universal but also concrete. 21 A directive
that brokers invest for clients only in high-grade securities is rule-like because it is
particular and specific but still abstract. 22
This conceptual approach thus results in arraying provisions along a continuum
from principle to rule, classified according to how many of the various attributes of rule
or principle characterize a provision. 23 Although the continuum metaphor has
18

Cf. Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 630 (1944) (no writing can prove its
own completeness).

19

NASD Manual, Rule NASD Rule 2110 (“A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade”).
20

Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990; SEC Rule 15g-1 through 9.

21

See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Act, § 501, amending 15 U.S.C. 78o-6.

22

See Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 679 (11th Cir. 1987).

23

See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
823, 828-32 (1991) (using the continuum metaphor); Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, supra note
___, at 57 (same); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 604-610
9

considerable appeal, a few scholars question how useful or rigorous the imagery is. 24
Indeed, a limitation of this conceptual approach is that there is no logical limit to the
number or type of attributes that might be used in the classification process and there is
no crisp way to rank their magnitude or importance. At best, the result is a classification
scheme bearing a fuzzy logic, in which intuition plays as much a role as hard-headed
conceptualization.
Finally, a functional approach to classifying a legal or accounting provision as a
rule or a principle considers the scope of discretion reposed in designated actors. The
more discretion a provision reposes the more it is principle-like and the less discretion
reposed the more it is rule-like.
This approach is satisfactory only in those rare
circumstances involving limited groups of actors. For example, if a provision relates
only to legislatures and judges, this approach can weigh how much discretion the
legislature reposes in judges. However, the utility of this classification declines with
increasing numbers of actor groups.
Provisions that purport to restrict a given actor’s discretion by rule-like precision
may increase discretion in other actors. For example, legislatively-established criminal
sentencing guidelines limit judicial discretion concerning punishment. But they increase
prosecutorial discretion when making charging decisions. In accounting, using a rule or
principle to constrain or create managerial discretion simultaneously affects the relative
discretion held by auditors engaged to review managerial decisions. 25
A weakness of all the foregoing classification methods is that they do not
necessarily enable classifying all the possible permutations that legal or accounting
provisions can assume. A large portion of laws (and many accounting provisions) do not
fit either category, however specified, nor do some provisions readily appear to reside
between the poles. Consider factor tests. 26 A law against market manipulation, for
example, may be tested according to factors such as the timing, frequency and structure
of given securities trades. 27 Similarly, corporate laws and securities regulations can use

(synthesizing the virtues of “crystalline” and “muddy” articulations of legal provisions, akin to the iterative
conception).
24

See James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line–Balancing Test Continuum,
27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 773, 776-777 (1995) (conceiving of a rules-principles continuum is an analytical deadend, a matter of technique rather than bearing normative significance); Scott Brewer, Exemplary
Reasoning, Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 925, 972 (1996) (dismissing the notion of a continuum on grounds that it conflates distinct
phenomena of logic and semantics that must be kept distinct).
25

See Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on the Effects of Principles- and Rules-Based Standards, 17
ACCT. REV. 91 (2003).
26

See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 963-964 (1995).

27

See infra text accompanying notes ___-___.
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presumptions that may be rebutted. These may or may not exhibit principle-like or rulelike qualities. 28
Any approach to classifying legal or accounting provisions as rules or principles
is thus contestable and leaves room for refinement. Yet uniting all the varying
classification methods is a kind of super-ordinate attribute: vagueness. Principles are
vaguer compared to rules which are less vague. Vagueness is greater when a provision
offers less ex ante guidance because much of its definitional content is provided only ex
post; vagueness is increased by the features of abstractness, generality, and universality;
and provisions are vaguer when they repose greater discretion in actors compared to
those that constrain discretion. While admittedly imperfect, in the ensuing discussion and
analysis I treat provisions as classifiable along a rules-principles spectrum according to
their relative vagueness.
3. Trade-Offs — Perhaps the most difficult problem appearing in the literature on
rules and principles concerns trade-offs when choosing which to favor. The literature
acknowledges some reasonable approximations of trade-offs and yet scholars challenge
their overall validity. To illustrate, consider how the legal obligations of securities
brokers should be stated as to whether to recommend a security. One possibility is a rulelike provision that prohibits recommending anything other than AAA-rated bonds.
Another is a principle-like directive requiring that the broker evaluate the investment’s
suitability in relation to a customer’s risk tolerance and investment objectives.
The rule appeals for its relative certainty and predictability; the principle appeals
for its relative capacity to exploit advantageous circumstances and possibly avoid
undesirable ones. On the downside, rules can be blueprints for evading their underlying
purposes. Bright lines and exceptions to exceptions facilitate strategic evasion, allowing
artful dodging of a rule’s spirit by literal compliance with its technical letter. Rules can
benefit resourceful and informed parties (such as brokers) yet harm reliant and ignorant
ones (such as customers). 29 In rapidly-changing environments, such as securities
markets, rules can become obsolete faster than principles do. 30 Principles may promote
conservatism among regulated actors, protect other participants and have longer shelflives. But they pose problems of uncertainty and ex post surprise, which can impair
achieving goals such as, in securities regulation, market efficiency and public perceptions
of fairness.
Promulgation and compliance costs vary. In general, rules are more costly than
principles to create and principles are more costly than rules to comply with. 31 When
28

See Ruth Gavison, Legal Theory and the Role of Rules, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727, 750-752
(1991).
29

See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting out of Securities Regulation
by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 562-563 (1999).
30

See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245,
1265 (2003).

31

See Kaplow, supra note ___.
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rules enable relatively cheap compliance, compliance is more likely; but when principles
mean compliance is relatively costly, non-compliance risk rises. 32
The desirability of a rule or principle may be clearer in some cases than in others.
The clarity depends on the possibility of defining the importance of relative objectives.
This conventionally involves determining which are more important, predictability and
certainty or fairness and context. In general, constraining discretion to promote
predictability and certainty dictates adopting rules; emphasizing fairness and contextual
sensitivity leads to the formulation of principles.
Yet the precise trade-off between certainty and context is not always clear. A
principle can be more certain than a dense weave of rules. 33 For example, a vague
articulation can yield a well-understood meaning while a densely specified series of
articulations can yield competing understandings. The Sherman Antitrust Act may be
vague when using the terms contract, conspiracy and restraint of trade but shared
understanding of the meaning of these terms combine to give a more rule-like quality to
the statute. While such shared understandings may have more to do with the nature of
language and meaning than with the nature of rules and principles, language and meaning
cannot be divorced from an evaluation of the trade-offs associated with principles versus
rules.
Moreover, rules may promote certainty in a given context but export uncertainty
to others; principles may promote flexibility in given contexts but also show
“expansionist tendencies” that curtail flexibility in others. 34 Nor are the alternatives
always trade-offs. A combination of certainty and contextual sensitivity is possible. To
provide certainty, a rule must be flexible; to be open-ended, a principle must be stable. 35
These observations make it difficult to contend that rules always provide more certainty
than principles or that principles always provide more contextual sensitivity than rules.
Indeed, rules may be more certain for contexts that are simple, stable and involve small
stakes but less certain when addressed to complex, dynamic, high-stakes contexts. 36 This
is especially so when new rules are adopted and subject to change during implementation
and evolution. 37
32

See id.

33

See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue Code or Body of Principles?, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1702, 1703 (2006) (demonstrating, in the context of the Fourth Amendment, how
“principled rules provide clearer guidance to law enforcement and citizens than arbitrary ‘bright-line’
rules”).
34

35

36

Schlag, Rules and Standards, supra note ___, at 411-14
Id. at 405-407.

See Braithwaite, A Theory of Legal Certainty, supra note ___; RICHARD A. POSNER, PROBLEMS
JURISPRUDENCE 48 (1990).
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See Brett H. McDonnell, SOX Appeals, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 529 (making this point in the
context of the rules-heavy Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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To summarize, the literature addressing rules and principles reflects considerable
struggle, especially as to classification and trade-offs and even as to labeling. This is due,
in part, to how laws (and accounting provisions) address vast territories, pursue varying
objectives and assume a wide variety of forms, complexity, notice content and production
methods. True, individual provisions can be classified along a rules-principles spectrum
according to their relative vagueness and associated trade-offs can be worked out for
designing provisions to suit objectives. Yet the foregoing review suggests that these are
neither simple nor incontestable matters even at the level of treating individual
provisions.
B. Treatment of Entire Systems
The issues discussed in the preceding section become impossibly complex and
contestable when one tries to describe entire systems as either “rules-based” or
“principles-based.” Descriptions of large complex regulatory systems must assess not
only the character of all their individual provisions but also how those provisions are
interpreted, enforced and applied as well as how they interact. Accounting for all these
factors casts doubt upon the analytical utility of using the binary terminology of “rulesbased” versus “principles-based” to describe such systems.
1. Threshold — The simplest way to reach a characterization of a system as
“rules-based” or “principles-based” would be based on an inventory of the form in which
individual provisions are expressed. At this simple level, a principles-based system is
one in which all, a majority or the most important articulations are vague and a rulesbased system is in one which such provisions are non-vague. In considering whether
such systems are possible or desirable as a threshold matter, it would be important to
provide a theoretical or philosophical foundation for favoring either.
It is difficult to provide such foundations. Consider two alternative intellectual
traditions that address relative preferences for rules versus principles within a system: law
and economics and critical theories. While each may support a systemic preference for
rules or principles, this support is too limited to defend systemic classifications of rulesbased or principles-based.
Law-and-economics scholarship addressing rules and principles guides analysis
according to a desire to detail law as efficiently as possible. 38 Theorists seek the optimal
precision of law, 39 informed by formal characterization of associated costs. 40 A

38

See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 262 (1974).
39

See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L. J. 65 (1983).

13

decidedly directive stance in this tradition is to promote certainty. This means a general
preference for stating posited law in the form of rules, rather than principles. 41 But since
principles also can promote certainty, this analysis cannot defend a system fairly
characterized as rules-based. Indeed, contemporary economic analysis increasingly
favors principles, especially when informed by behavioral theories, which question how
much certainty rules provide as compared to principles, 42 or by game theory, which
explores how principles may be better than rules to facilitate bargaining and neutralize
strategic behavior. 43
At the other extreme, critical theories may be invoked to support the virtues of
principles compared to rules. Important work in this tradition positions the normative
forms of argument favoring rules or principles in terms of political consciousness. A
leading illustration is how arguments favoring rules can resemble the form of arguments
that favor individualism and how arguments favoring principles can resemble the form of
arguments that favor altruism. 44 An example of this parallel is how arguments favoring
principles include that they can promote contextual sensitivity. To the extent that one
prefers the forms of argument favoring altruism one may likewise support favoring a
legal system that uses principles whenever possible.
Yet this methodology restates the rules-principles argument in other terms, in this
case by analogy to individualism-altruism. The analysis that suggests that rules and
principles reside along a continuum could likewise be restated: people are rarely either
purely individualistic or purely altruistic but show varying degrees of such attributes in
varying contexts. Furthermore, principles do not have a monopoly on promoting
contextual sensitivity, a virtue that rules can also promote. Thus, as with economic
analysis, this conceptualization does not enable defending the creation or maintenance of
systems that rely exclusively or predominantly on principles rather than rules.
2. Applications — Even if one could simply inventory the character of individual
provisions within a system to classify them as rules-based or principles-based, and defend
40

See, e.g., Kaplow, Rules and Standards, supra note ___; see also Gavison, Legal Theory and the Role of
Rules, supra note ___, at ___.
41

See, e.g., Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note ___, at 590-595 (not necessarily endorsing, but elucidating
this position); Clifford Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 322-26
(1985).

42

See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L.
REV. 23 (2000); Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An
Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004)
43

See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean
Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995).

44

Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); see
also Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349
(1982).
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it according to objectives such as certainty or contextual sensitivity, this simple exercise
is incomplete. Suppose that an inventory of the individual provisions that comprise US
securities regulation or accounting justify the common descriptions of these systems as
“rules-based.” To sustain that characterization for the system as a whole would also
require accounting for how those provisions are interpreted, enforced and applied.
Individual provisions may be classifiable as either rule or principle when stated as
a legal norm but they are subject to a separate set of decision norms that govern their
application. 45 For example, a decision norm may guide judges toward either a formalistic
or instrumentalist methodology. A provision fairly classified as a rule may retain that
character when applied using a formalist (or literalist) methodology but may assume the
attributes of a principle when applied using an instrumentalist (or purposive or dynamic)
methodology. These two levels of definition thus complicate any claim that a legal
system is principles-based or rules-based.
These complexities can be dramatized by comparing descriptions of national legal
systems. Consider the following example of alternative conceptions of such systems: 46
In some legal cultures, it is generally understood that rules should
be read literally, that the appliers and interpreters of rules should not be
empowered to modify the rules at the point of application, that judges
should interpret rules according to their ordinary meaning except in the
most egregious cases, and that the virtues of specificity and predictability
are more important, especially within the legal system, than the virtues of
flexibility in the face of changing or unforeseen circumstances. . . .
In other legal systems, by contrast, the virtues of rule-ness and
formality are less apparent, and it is widely accepted that reaching the
correct outcome in the individual case is more important than the virtues
brought by rigid obedience to specific rules. In these societies, the ruleameliorating devices, rather than being scorned, are celebrated, and ruleinterpreters, rule-enforcers, and rule-appliers who refuse to employ these
devices are typically castigated with epithets like “mechanistic” and
“formalistic.”
Using prevailing global jargon, at least in terms of the application of laws, the
first conception might be called a rules-based system and the second a principles-based
system. Which better describes the US legal system? In prevalent global classifications,
especially in securities regulation and accounting, the US system is depicted as rulesbased while other national systems and international accounting are dubbed principlesbased. 47 The foregoing passage continues as follows:
45

See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
46

Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 303, 320-321.

47

See supra notes 1 & 7 (citing sources).
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As should be apparent, there is a widespread view, supported by
some moderately serious research, that the US is the best example of the
latter, and that most other advanced legal systems are at least somewhat
closer to the former than is the US.
Interestingly, this conclusion (which seems correct) contradicts prevailing global
classification—at least as it concerns securities regulation and accounting. This may
simply reflect that the foregoing descriptions concentrate on application rather than initial
formulation. It also may simply mean that those subjects are special cases (and that
accounting is not law in the US).
More generally, however, this contrast is congruent with the difficulties sampled
in the previous section concerning classification of individual provisions as rules or
principles and navigation of the trade-offs that individual provisions pose. When
positioned in the broader context of entire systems that must also take account of the
norms of decision-making, the credible but contradictory descriptions justify more
skepticism about whether “rules-based” or “principles-based” can be analytically reliable
descriptions of any comprehensive legal system (or accounting system).
3. Interactions — Beyond the crude exercise of inventorying the character of
individual provisions and the additional complexity of addressing how those provisions
are applied, one must consider the further complexity that arises from how individual
provisions interact within a system. Adding this complexity fortifies skepticism about
such systemic labeling.
Consider the simple driving regulation illustration appearing in the rules versus
principles literature. An individual speed limit can be stated more vaguely (a reasonable
speed) or less vaguely (55 mph). Which is superior for a given roadway varies according
to numerous factors, such as traffic volume and patterns, safety, serenity and energy
conservation. Taking account of these factors, no functional system could establish either
as the law for all roads within it.
Indeed, a law designating the speed limit as 55 mph on a given roadway implicitly
endorses that as a reasonable speed. A principle directing drivers to cruise at a
reasonable speed requires assigning meaning to the word reasonable which would be
interpreted, in part, in relation to zones carrying a designated limit. So a system of
driving regulations invariably contains a mixture of rules and principles. Good examples
are laws that prohibit driving faster than a reasonable speed notwithstanding any
particular posted limits or driving at a reasonable speed but in no event exceeding 35
mph. Such systems in which rules and principles co-exist and interact are neither rulesbased nor principles-based.
The same interaction of rules and principles appears in virtually any complex
legal system. Consider two individual provisions contributing to the law of insider
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trading within the larger system of US securities regulation. Section 16(b) provides a
“short-swing profit” rule which penalizes certain kinds of insider trading by officers and
directors; 48 Section 10(b) contains broad anti-fraud principles that have been interpreted
to prohibit insider trading by officers, directors and many other persons. 49 It is possible
to conceive of the rule and the principle as substitutes. 50 If a system contained only the
rule it could be called rules-based and if it contained only the principle it could be called
principles-based. What is the proper characterization when a system uses both, as in the
US?
The two provisions interact in complex ways that prevent citing either of them to
support characterizing the system as rules-based or principles-based. The rule of 16(b)
compels disgorgement of short-swing profits, meaning gains on securities transactions by
designated insiders within a stated time period without regard to intent. The principle of
10(b) makes it criminal for unspecified insiders to trade in securities on the basis of
material non-public information. The two laws share a similar general purpose, of
prohibiting securities market profit-making based on selectively available information,
but Section 10(b) advances a fairness objective in relation to external shareholders while
Section 16(b) also advances a management regulation objective in relation to business
operations. 51
The rule’s designation of certain corporate insiders and transactions promotes
certainty that the principle’s open-endedness otherwise prevents. 52 In some cases, issues
arising under one of the provisions can be useful in discerning the appropriate application
of the other, as where a problem that the rule does not address is sufficiently handled by

48

15 U.S.C. 78p(b) (designated insiders must disgorge profits from securities transactions occurring within
a six-month window).

49

15 U.S.C. 78j; Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5; United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); see
infra text accompanying notes ___-___.
50

Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, supra note ___, at 321-25 (treating these provisions
as substitutes).

51

See Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 391, 399 (1991) (making the case that the purpose of §16(b) was to prevent insiders from
manipulating corporate operations to induce favorable stock price fluctuations); Roberta S. Karmel, The
Relationship between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibition against Insider Trading: Why a Property
Rights Theory of Inside Information is Untenable (Book Review) 59 BROOKLYN L. REV. 149, n. 51 (1993)
(§16(b)’s benefits not achieved by §10(b) are promoting long-term rather than short-term outlook among
management and discouraging them from manipulating events over the short term); Merritt B. Fox, Insider
Trading Deterrence versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV.
2088 (1994) (reconciling the overall framework); but see Marleen O’Connor, Toward a More Efficient
Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 309 (1989).
52

See Steven R. Salbo, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global Marketplace: A Uniform Statutory
Approach, 66 TUL. L. REV. 837, 861 (1992) (“Clear and precise regulation of insider trading would
eliminate the need for section 16(b)”).
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the principle. 53 The presence of both provisions and their interaction shows the difficulty
of the simple method of inventorying all provisions within a system to classify it as
principles-based or rules-based.
Consider a broader illustration of how individual provisions that make up the
larger system of federal securities regulation interact. At stake in contexts governed by
Section 10(b) are broad principles of materiality and disclosure. Invocation of those
concepts in one context illuminates their meaning in others, including in contexts to
which separate rules apply. For example, a fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in making an investment
decision. 54
Under that definition, rules that mandate disclosure using mechanical tests can be
understood to designate such information as material. 55 Thus Section 13(d) requires
owners of 5% or more of the voting power in registered equity securities of any company
to disclose specific information about their equity position and intent with respect to
corporate control. 56 Such a rule can be justified on the grounds that investors would
consider such ownership and plans to be important as the materiality principle defines it.
Section 13(d) may be a rule and Section 10(b) a principle but the interaction between
them contributes systemic qualities that frustrate tidy categorization of the system as
rules-based or principles-based.
4. Benefits — Even if one were to decide that a system’s inventory of
expressions is or should be “principles-based” or “rules-based,” that those attributes are
sustained through both their applications and interactions, it would remain difficult to
contend that a commitment to those systemic qualities is desirable. At a basic level,
interactions among individual rules and principles within a larger system can produce
numerous benefits. Apart from enabling a closer fit between form and objectives, these
benefits include the following.

53

See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 255 (1976) (while §16(b)’s scope is
unaffected by whether other sanctions might inhibit abuse of inside information, §10(b) is available to
handle some of those other problems not addressed by §16(b)).
54

See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality
Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (2003).
55

See Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75
VA. L. REV. 723, 727 (1989) (“The particular items of information mandated to be disclosed [under SEC
rules] are presumably automatically deemed to be ‘material’.”). Thousands of examples of prescribed
items can be cited, including the specific requirements found in (a) Item 11 to Form S-1 concerning the
required prospectus for offering securities, (b) Items 1-8 to Form 8-K stating events that require filing a
current report and (c) the content of both quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and annual reports on Form 10-K.
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Exchange Act, §13(d); 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1 (2006); see Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49,
58 (1971) (emphasizing purpose of rule to provide shareholders with information about the bidder and
incumbent management to provide additional information of its own without any intention to aid
management in resisting a bid by tipping the balance of power between bidders and managers).
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First, interaction between individual rules and principles within a larger system
constrains abuse of power, by both those subject to the provisions and those who enforce
them. Risk of power abuse arises from principles without rules or from rules without
principles.
Imagine a principles-only system, such as one stating only that public companies
must “disclose all material facts” (period) or that their financial statements must “be
fairly presented” (period). How do managers determine what to do in a given
circumstance? Who decides whether companies have complied with the principles?
How will an enforcer make the case that a violation occurred or a manager defend against
the charge? Vague concepts such as materiality and fairness unaccompanied by some
specific content create risks of both ad hoc managerial decision-making and arbitrary
enforcement. Some specificity reflecting rule-like characteristics is necessary to give
meaning to such principles. Alone, they are vulnerable to abuse.
Conversely, imagine a rules-only system, such as a specific schedule of required
items of disclosure listed from A to Z or triggered by events one through ten. Absent
accompanying principles, rule-makers operate by fiat. Managers need not think or
exercise judgment, even when following those rules produces absurd results. Some may
even exploit the rules as blueprints to achieve such absurd results. Principles are
necessary to mediate the rules.
Second, the co-existence of rules and principles within a system helps to assess its
coherence. The concept of materiality in securities regulation might be expected to mean
the same thing in different contexts; if it does not, an explanation for the difference is
required. 57 If variations cannot be convincingly explained, then either the rules are not
based on principles or they are based on the wrong principles. 58 For example, Section
13(d), which requires 5% owners to disclose their position and intent concerning control,
should bear some logical relation to the concept of materiality. Thus, the rule is coherent
if it requires disclosure of information that “reasonable investors would consider
important in making an investment decision.”
Third, the interaction among rules and principles reduces anxiety over whether an
individual provision should initially be formed as a rule or a principle. The issue is how
much the form of articulation controls its application and interaction with other
provisions so that outcomes vary in otherwise equivalent circumstances. Perhaps there is
some control, but with dynamic interaction, convergence occurs to limit its effect. As an
extreme example, with separation of governmental powers, legislatures may create laws
residing toward either end of the rules-principles spectrum. When legislatures choose
rules, judges often relax and thus transform them into laws exhibiting principles-like
features; when legislatures enact principles, judges can tighten them into laws with rule-
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See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).

58

See Christopher W. Nobes, Rules-Based Standards and the Lack of Principles in Accounting, 19 ACCT.
HORIZONS 25 (2005).
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like features. 59 This observation does not mean that the initial legislative choice is
inconsequential; it may be of considerable significance in given cases. However, it also
suggests that the choice is not final so that the form does not control the application.
This observation also contributes perspective on any systemic preference for
expressing individual provisions as rules or principles. The dynamic interaction of
individual rules and principles within larger systems suggests caution about designing a
legal or accounting system that presumptively privileges rules or principles. If any
presumption were warranted at an abstract level, it would suggest having a combination
of rules and principles to maximize the benefits of the interaction among them. But even
that presumption risks overlooking important trade-offs associated with formulating
individual provisions and ignoring the dynamics of their application and interaction
within the larger system.
II. A SURVEY OF THE SYSTEMS
While the preceding discussion suggests conceptual difficulties in imagining how
any legal or accounting system can be either rules-based or principles-based, the
following discussion surveys actual and proposed systems of corporate law, securities
regulation and accounting. It attempts to provide, for each system, both an inventory of
individual provisions and a sense of how the provisions are applied and how they
interact. The examination justifies more skepticism that any of these systems may fairly
be described using such labels.
A. Existing Systems
A canvas of the major topics appearing on the syllabus in corporations and
securities regulation, and some of the commonly cited topics in accounting, suggests that
misconceptions exist about how they may be classified as rules-based or principles-based.
At minimum, common conceptions are overstated.
1. Corporate Law — Scholars commonly describe corporate law, especially
Delaware corporate law, as principles-based, 60 although some see a more rules-like

59

See Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, supra note ___, at 321-325; infra text
accompanying notes ___-___ (example of the relationship between §102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law authorizing director-liability exculpation and the judicial doctrine of good faith that
amplifies an exception to that authorization).
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See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 1205, 1236 (2001) (“Delaware’s corporate law tends to rely on standard-based tests [meaning] that
the relation between a certain set of facts and the outcome of a legal dispute is determined ex post rather
than ex ante”); Curtis Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2212 (2005) (“The major features of Delaware corporate law [include] the
prevalence of broad standards over detailed rules”); Ehud Kamar, A Jurisdictional competition Theory of
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1914-1915 (1998) (“Delaware [corporate] law
is at one end of this continuum. It relies extensively on broad legal standards”).
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quality among the principles. 61 As the following discussion shows, both are credible
positions, meaning that neither is clearly correct. Corporate law is a mixture of rules and
principles whose application and interaction generates a rich complex tapestry that
diminishes the utility of any such tidy classifications.
Before deeply examining corporate law, note first that inquiry concerning rules
versus principles in corporate law is distinct from the debate in corporate law scholarship
concerning whether the law is or should be more mandatory or enabling. 62 Corporate law
doctrines array along a rules-principles continuum whether they are required by law or
optional. Take cumulative voting. Most state statutes authorize but do not require using
this voting method. 63 Even so, the law of cumulative voting is best located at the rules
end of the range, for it denotes a specific mathematical formula for casting and counting
votes in director elections. In the minority of states that require cumulative voting,
disputes concerning its use may be resolved by applying principles-like tools such as
fiduciary duty. 64
At the rules end of the corporate law spectrum are provisions that establish a
hierarchy of sources of legal authority. This hierarchy puts state corporation law statutes
at the top, followed by articles of incorporation (the charter), then by-laws and then
contracts (with judicial decisions hovering throughout). So statutes may authorize
corporations to adopt tailored provisions suiting particular goals, but then require that any
tailored provision appear in the charter or in the by-laws. 65 Courts treat as a dead letter

61

Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate
Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1133-1134 (2004) (“Delaware law of fiduciary
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CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (“Delaware’s corporate law rules are standards based”) (emphasis added); Edward
B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1104
(1997) (criticizing “a persistent tendency to acknowledge that Delaware corporate law largely involves
standards, but then to try to reduce it to a set of rules”).
62

See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial
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64
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provisions placed in the wrong document. 66 When the charter and by-laws contain
conflicting provisions, a corporate law rule provides that the charter controls. 67
Rules delineate the distribution of power in corporate life. The basic rule relating
to shareholder power is a simple negative injunction: shareholders have no general power
over management of a corporation.68 Corporation statutes provide that boards have this
power. Statutes grant shareholders power in specific situations, usually director
elections, charter amendments, certain business combinations and dissolutions. 69 Even in
specific cases where shareholders have power, they usually lack authority to initiate
action but may only consent to (or withhold consent from) board-made proposals.70
Rules require that shareholders elect directors. 71 Rules granting managerial power
to boards are accompanied by additional rules regulating board conduct. Directors have
no power to act individually, but only to bind the corporation when acting together as a
board. Both statutory rules and judicial applications impose stringent formalities for
board action. For example, the statutes contain rules requiring notice and quorums and
also authorize action by written consent in lieu of meetings but only if unanimous and
using teleconference connections but only if specified requirements are met. 72
Why all these rules? They provide a baseline ordering mechanism necessary to
create the formal creature law calls the corporation; they also begin to shape the balance
of power among its participants. 73 Principles come into play and mediate these rules,
provide rationales, and interact with them to alter the system’s overall character. Thus
while the hierarchy of corporate law sources contributes apparent rule-like certainty, it is
possible to persuade a court to enforce, as a contract, a provision placed in a by-law when
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See Roach v. Bynum, 437 So.2d 69 (Ala. 1983) (super-majority shareholder quorum and voting provision
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a statute directs it to appear in the charter. 74 Rules granting managerial power to boards
and episodic consenting power to shareholders are relaxed considerably into a principleslike framework for closely-held corporations, a context in which many traditional rules of
corporate law similarly relax into principles. 75
Toward the rules end of the corporate law spectrum are provisions governing the
forms of business combinations and divestitures. Corporate law offers a menu of
alternative forms, including statutory merger, asset sales and stock sales. 76 This enables
transaction engineers to structure deals that, while having identical substantive effects,
may or may not require a shareholder vote or carry appraisal rights. 77 Courts respect
formal rules, invoking such further rules as the doctrine of independent legal significance
(in effect, a denial of the so-called de facto merger doctrine). 78 To protect against hostile
takeover bids, moreover, statutes offer rule-bound anti-takeover provisions. 79
Rules also enable designing transactions to achieve identical substantive results
using subsidiary corporations that likewise avoid shareholder votes or appraisal rights.
Courts similarly defer to these structural maneuvers, projecting a rigid rule-like quality to
these laws. 80 They respect statutory distinctions between redemptions and mergers, even
when transactional alternatives present identical substantive consequences to
shareholders. 81 The same rule-bound results follow in relation to third parties.
Transactions structured as mergers mean that all assets and liabilities of the constituent
corporations combine “by operation of law” with immutable implications for third-party
consents 82 whereas in asset or stock acquisitions they transfer by operation of contract
with changeable implications for third-party consents. 83
74

See Jones v. Wallace, 628 P.2d 388 (Or. 1981).

75

See, e.g., Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980) (enforcing agreement despite noncompliance with
statutory provisions); Triggs v. Triggs, 385 N.E.2d 1254 (N.Y. 1978) (same); see also Larry E. Ribstein &
Burce Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 85 & 89
(2001).
76

Del. Gen. Corp. L. §§ 241 (redemptions), 251 (mergers), 271 (asset sales); see also Model Act, § 11.03
(share exchange).

77

See Heilbrunn v. Sun Chemical, 150 A.2d 755 (Del. 1959); Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d
123 (Del. 1963).
78

See D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture
Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825 (2004).
79

E.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 203 (specific rules lay out ex ante instructions using extensive definition, of
terms such as interested stockholder, and bright-lines, such as 90-day and 3-year periods and 66.66%
voting and 85% ownership thresholds).
80

See, e.g., Equity Group Holdings v. DMG, 576 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (applying Florida law).

81

See, e.g., Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying Delaware law).

82

See PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus., 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 930 (1979).

83

See Branmar Theatre v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526 (Del. Ch. 1970).
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Why these rules? As with the rules and principles establishing and mediating the
hierarchy of sources in corporate law, these rules prescribe mechanical devices to govern
a corporation’s life; they also allocate power among participants. How are they
mediated? As to respecting forms of corporate combinations, the de facto merger
doctrine sometimes prevails for shareholders and more often succeeds when advanced by
other constituencies to challenge formal transaction structures. Thus, non-shareholder
claimants increasingly succeed in invoking the de facto merger doctrine when asserting
claims in tort, labor and environmental law. 84
The statutory law of appraisal rights is intensely rule-bound, especially in
Delaware. There, appraisal provisions are a detailed labyrinth of rules that first grant
rights, then deny those rights, and then restore some of those rights, depending on stated
formal attributes of a transaction. 85 Yet courts awarding the appraisal remedy face
numerous questions whose resolution requires applying vague concepts. These involve
such matters as whether the appraisal remedy is exclusive or may be conjoined with other
claims, 86 the applicable valuation method, 87 and identification of the business to be
valued. 88 Resulting appraisal remedy doctrine can be described as rules-based or
principles-based because, in fact, it is a mixture—but neither is a particularly faithful
description.
Toward the principles end of the continuum in corporate law are the laws of
fiduciary duty, mainly the duties of care and loyalty. It is possible to understand much of
Delaware corporate fiduciary duty law as hortatory sermonizing. 89 Many characterize
Delaware fiduciary duty law as indeterminate, putting it squarely on the principles
(vague) end of any continuum. 90 That location is unsurprising when one considers that
Delaware courts conceive of themselves as courts in equity (a designation still formally
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See, e.g., Ruiz v. Blentech Corp., 89 F.3d 320 (7th Cir. 1996) (personal injuries); Fall River Dyeing &
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987) (labor); North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d 642
(7th Cir. 1998) (environmental).
85

Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 262.

86

See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498
A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985); Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (2001).
87

Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).

88

Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (whether the business to be valued is solely
the business as it existed absent the transaction or taking account of value that arises in the first-stage of a
two-step acquisition).
89

See Rock, Saints and Sinners, supra note ___.

90

See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 53 n. 221 (2005) (citing and summarizing more than a dozen articles
offering competing assessments of the virtues of such indeterminacy in Delaware corporate fiduciary duty
law).
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retained by its Court of Chancery). 91 Even when statutorily codified, as in the Model
Business Corporation Act (the Model Act), the duty of care bears a vague general quality
typically associated with principles. 92
Still, fiduciary duty cases addressing designated doctrinal subjects can be
synthesized into recognizable rules. 93 In mundane cases of ordinary business decisions
or activity, the business judgment rule presumes that directors met their duty of care. The
few cases exposing directors to liability for breaching the duty of care in ordinary
contexts address egregious behavior, as when directors are inebriated, ill-informed or
commit illegal acts. 94 A rule emerges that directors are liable for breach of the duty of
care in ordinary settings only when drunk, ignorant or criminal. Corporations also can
opt for a statute-authorized rule against personal director financial liability for breaching
the duty of care, 95 a license created immediately after the Delaware Supreme Court held
ill-informed directors liable for breaching the duty. 96
That license assumes the form of a rule: it concretely and prospectively authorizes
exculpation. The rule has a limit. Exculpation does not extend to liability arising from
“acts or omissions not in good faith.” 97 The vast majority of Delaware corporations took
advantage of the rule. That, in turn, contributed to increasing judicial invocation of a
principle of good faith. 98 Resulting judicial opinions are complex and so difficult to
reconcile that they provide little advance direction. 99 The result is a vagueness
91

See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law after QVC and
Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593 (1994); Lyman P.Q.
Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1149, 1193-94 (2004).
92

See Model Act § 8.30; D. Gordon Smith, A Proposal to Eliminate Director Standards from the Model
Business Corporation Act, 68 CIN. L. REV. 1201 (1999).
93

See Paredes, A Systems Approach, supra note ___, at 1133-34; see also Rock, Saints and Sinners, supra
note ___, at 1104 (noting and criticizing tendency of scholars to pursue this route).
94

See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981); Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985); Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (applying New York law); see also In re
Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (opinion approving settlement elaborating, in dicta, on
duty of care’s bearing on maintaining a system of internal control).

95

Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7).

96

Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael
Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006).
97

Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7). The limitation also excludes liability arising from breaches of the duty of
loyalty, unlawful distributions, intentional misconduct, knowing violations of law and deriving improper
personal benefits. Id.
98

See Hillary Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006).
99

See Matthew R. Berry, Does Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless Directors From Personal
Liability? Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1125 (2004); John L. Reed &
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characteristic of principles. This development illustrates not only how rules and
principles interact but also how a relatively tight statutory rule enables its judicial
transformation into a much more open-ended principle. 100
The ultimate principle in corporate law is the duty of loyalty. 101 This forbids
corporate officers and directors to act contrary to the interests of their beneficiary,
traditionally meaning the corporation and its shareholders. When personal and corporate
interests conflict, the official must subordinate her interests to those of the corporation
and its shareholders. These abstract principles are mediated in many states by statutory
safe-harbor rules delineating processes that officials can follow to protect their decisions
from judicial rebuke in such “self-interested” transactions—usually approval by a
majority of disinterested and fully-informed directors or shareholders. 102
Although written as rules, the linguistic character of such statutes requires
interpretation that judges perform to mediate between the principle of loyalty and the
rules of process that the statutes articulate. From the interaction, cases produce results
with varying degrees of vagueness (blending attributes of rules and principles). Thus,
even though the duty of loyalty is equity-like, it still carries hints of rule-ness. This
quality manifests in the tests that Delaware courts use to evaluate breaches of the duty in
contexts in addition to self-interested transactions, especially the entire fairness test in
cash-out mergers and the heightened scrutiny applied in takeover contexts. 103
In cash-out mergers, judges endorse using an independent committee to mimic an
arms’-length transaction measured by fair value. 104 In takeovers, courts particularize
abstract fiduciary duty to require boards to auction a company to the highest bidder if a
sale is to be effected; 105 if a transaction does not amount to a sale, then associated
Matt Neiderman, Good Faith and the Ability of Directors to Assert §102(b)(7) of the Delaware
Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of
Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111 (2004); David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in
Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2004).
100

See supra text accompanying notes ___-___.

101

E.g., Schnell v. Christ-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (“inequitable action does not
become permissible simply because it is legally possible”).
102

See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 144; Model Act §§ 8.60-8.63.

103

See Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s Takeover Jurisprudence, 19
J. CORP. L. 583 (1994) (offering coherent account of Delaware takeover cases despite much criticism of
them as incoherent); Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover
Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103 (2003) (offering coherent account of the cases using the theory of the firm).

104

Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651
(Del. Ch. 1988); see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 43436 (1993) (discussing process-oriented concept of fairness in corporate law).

105

See Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, 678 A.2d 533 (Del. 1996); Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (1989).
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defensive tactics must survive a reasonableness test.106 In both contexts, courts review
whether directors were independent and followed a sufficient process to benefit
shareholders, blending rules and principles. 107
If corporate law contains both rules and principles that are applied and interact in
these classification-defying ways, does it matter whether an articulation originates as a
rule or as a principle? Two examples suggest that it matters little. First, laws governing
shareholder distributions can be stated either way. Traditional statutes, such as
Delaware’s, are detailed rules that apply concepts of par value and legal capital; 108
modern statutes, like the Model Act, use general principles, forbidding distributions if
making them would prevent the corporation from paying its debts when due or reduce its
assets below liabilities (measured using any methods that are reasonable in the
circumstances). 109 Courts apply the traditional statutes liberally, allowing boards to
measure statutory terms (such as assets and liabilities) according to reasonable valuations
they choose. 110 Perhaps it matters whether one or the other is the starting point, but this
evidence suggests that it matters only slightly. 111
Second, a similar lawmaking option characterizes corporate law governing asset
sales. Traditional statutes require shareholder consent when a corporation’s board
proposes to sell “all or substantially all” the corporation’s assets. 112 Innovative statutes
attempt greater specification by requiring a shareholder vote only if the transaction leaves
the corporation “without a significant continuing business activity.” 113 Comparing the
provisions, the traditional one is relatively more principles-like and the innovative one
slightly more rule-like (a pure rule formulation would define the threshold numerically,
106

See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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Emphasis on the process-oriented rules produces concern that directors and advisors use mindless
checklists to meet the expected requirements. See Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of
Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589, 589 (2006) (“tracing the waning of the duty of care: a rule that now requires
little more of a director than a ritualistic consideration of relevant data”); infra Part III.A.
108

Del. Gen. Corp. L. §§ 154, 160, 170, 171, 173, 244.
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Model Act, §§ 6.21 & 6.40.
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See Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 702 A.2d 150 (Del. 1997); Randall v. Bailey, 23
N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1940); Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying New York
law).
111

See BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL (3d ed. 1990); Craig A. Peterson &
Norman W. Hawker, Does Corporate Law Matter? Legal Capital Restrictions on Stock Distributions, 31
AKRON L. REV. 175 (1997) (empirical study showing that the forms may matter some for purposes of
signaling information to shareholders in the market even if they do not matter much in respect of creditor
protection).
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E.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 271.
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See Model Act § 12.02(a).
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and no US corporate law statute does so). Yet the alternative statutes lead to the same
result. 114
This survey spans much of the corporate law syllabus. A full examination would
confirm that rules and principles dot the landscape in blended measure, with applications
and interactions that influence and reshape systemic characteristics. Rule-like provisions
address corporate formation, preemptive rights, director removal and shareholder
oppression and deadlock; principle-like provisions mediate each of these. Principles-like
provisions also appear in the corporate opportunity doctrine, where case law also enables
synthesized statements bearing rule-like character; 115 limited liability is a rule subject to
exceptions based on public regarding principles; 116 and corporate dispute administration
is replete with yet another set of principles and rules, addressing matters such as
indemnification, special litigation committees and statutes of limitation. 117 But these
illustrations should suffice to question the possibility of tidy classification of corporate
law as rules-based or principles-based (in Delaware or other states).
2. Securities Regulation — Many scholars (and judges) nevertheless promote
Delaware corporate law as principles-based, especially when contrasting this with US
federal securities regulation, which is alleged to be rules-based. 118 Others believe that the
purpose of the asserted rules-density of federal securities regulation is to offset the

114

See Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 386, n. 79 (Del. Ch. 2004) (emphasizing
comparability of Delaware’s § 271 with the Model Act’s § 12.02(a) despite how they “differ verbally”),
aff’d 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005).

115

See Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 725 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1999) (drawing on synthesis of the
corporate opportunity doctrine as codified by the American Law Institute as a way to provide clarity to this
“murky area”); see also Harvey Gelb, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: Recent Cases and the Elusive
Goal of Clarity, 31 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 371 (surveying various state tests in corporate opportunity
doctrine, including factors of corporate capacity and information disclosure, showing both broad principles
and specific rules at work); Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the
Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 279, 208 (1998) (succinctly stating the doctrine in a
simple algorithm bearing a rule-like quality and expressing regret that “this doctrinal algorithm has proven
unwieldy in application”).
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See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036
(1991).
117

See Matthew G. Dore, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Claims: A Search for Middle
Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 695, 720-736 (1997).
118

E.g., Griffith & Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism, supra note ___, at 20-23 (contrasting Delaware
corporate law’s “supple,” “flexible,” “subtle” and “responsive” corporate law to federal securities
regulation which involves “issuing mandates,” “governance directives,” and “orders”); Kamar,
Jurisdictional competition Theory of Indeterminacy, supra note ___, at 1921 (“It is instructive . . . to
compare Delaware law with federal securities law, which [is] rule-based”); Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law’s Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 512-513
(2000) (flexible corporate law is more effective than “comparatively rigid, rules-based systems . . . such as
the securities laws”).
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deficiencies of state corporation law’s alleged penchant for principles. 119 US securities
regulation also often is decried as being rules-based in contrast to other nations’ securities
regulations, especially Canada’s, which are described as principles-based. 120 The
following survey of US securities regulation supports none of these characterizations.
At the rules end of the securities regulation continuum are the vast majority of
laws governing securities offerings. Entities, transactions and securities must be
registered and prescribed prospectuses prepared and circulated. As with much of the
structure of US federal securities regulation across all contexts, such provisions are
subject to exemptions and exceptions to the exemptions and are protected by safe
harbors. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 Act requires registration unless an
exemption exists. 121 Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act provide exemptions and SEC
regulations provide safe harbors, all of which contain precisely delineated
boundaries 122 —although some also use vague provisions such as a condition of good
faith 123 or depend on open-textured concepts such as whether an offering is “public” or
“private.” 124
Toward the rules end of the securities regulation continuum are many laws
governing securities firms. While mostly rule-like, they are tinged with an overlaying
texture best described as principle-like. Examples of broker-dealer rules are: net capital

119

See Mark J. Roe, Institutional Foundations for Securities Markets in the West (2002) (on file with the
author and available at http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/frydmanr/Roe-AER2003.doc).
120

E.g., Kuras, supra note ___ (Canadian versus US); Robert Wright, Enron: The Ambitious and the
Greedy, 16 WINDSOR REV. LEG. & SOC. ISSUES 71, 73 (2003) (Canadian versus US).
121

Securities Act, §5(a)(1) (making it unlawful to use interstate commerce to sell a security unless a
registration statement is effective); 5(a)(2) (forbidding using interstate commerce to carry an unregistered
security for purposes of selling or delivering it); 5(a)(3) (prohibiting offering to buy or sell a security before
a registration statement has been filed for it). Similarly, the Exchange Act exempts government and
municipal securities and numerous others. See Exchange Act, §3(a)(12) (defining “exempted security” for
purposes of otherwise required registration under Exchange Act §12(b)).
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Exempted classes of securities under the Securities Act include for self-employed benefit plans,
commercial paper, charitable and other nonprofit issuers, insurance, compensatory benefit plans and small
issues. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3(a)(2)-(4), (8); Rule 701; Regulations A & D. Exempted transactions
include exchanges with existing shareholders, intrastate issues, private offerings and transactions by dealers
and brokers. Id., §§ 3(a)(9), 3(a)(11), 4(1)-(4); Rules 144 & 144A. As to safe harbors, see, e.g., Securities
Act Rule 135 (addressing §5(c) liability); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569,
574 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc) (emphasizing rule-like character of the safe harbor, which it refers to as based
on a “checklist of features” that provides guidance superior to any “judicially formulated ‘rule of reason’”);
§10 (allowing tombstone advertisements).
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17 C.F.R. 231.646 (eligibility for §3(a)(9)’s exemption for exchanges with existing shareholders must
involve an exchange made in good faith and not one intended simply to evade the statute’s requirements).
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See, e.g., SEC Rel. No. 33-4552, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶¶ 2771-72 & 2275-76 (1962) (factors applied to
determine whether the private offering exemption is available include the identity, number and
sophistication of the offerees and size and manner of offer); 17 C.F.R. 231.285 (same).
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rules, 125 credit extension rules, 126 short-sale rules, 127 trading practices rules, 128 customer
confirmation rules, 129 and rules governing contingency offerings. 130 These rules are
supplemented by broad anti-fraud principles of general applicability131 and tailored to the
broker-dealer context by prohibitions on misappropriating customer funds or securities,
unsuitable or unauthorized trading, churning, and charging excessive markups. 132
Why these rules (as supplemented by the principles)? As with corporate laws
governing the hierarchy of sources of legal authority and addressing business
combinations and divestitures, securities regulations stating filing requirements and firm
conduct provide a baseline. They establish requirements that are fundamental to the
existence of a regulated disclosure system and securities industry. True, these laws are
not inevitable—the free market could be left to its own devices—but once a decision to
regulate is made, it is not surprising that the attributes of the regulatory system at this
basic level should be rule-like.
Nor is it surprising that such rules are mediated by associated principles. In fact,
all broker-dealer regulations ultimately derive from principles that predate US federal
securities acts as epitomized by the traditional “shingle theory” of securities
professionals. 133 For example, the duty to obtain best execution for customer
transactions is rooted in common law agency principles. 134 Other general principles that
flow from these traditional concepts include the imposition of duties on firms to
supervise employees. 135 Additional examples of principles include those that the SEC
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17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1 (including specifying methods of computing net capital).
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See, e.g., Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. 220.1 to 220.132.
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17 C.F.R. 240.10a-1.
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See Reg. M, 62 Fed. Reg. 520 (codified at 17 C.F.R. 242); Rules 101, 102, 62 Fed. Reg. 520, 546-548
(codified at 17 C.F.R. 242.1-10243.102).
129
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Exchange Act Rule 10b-10.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-9, 240.15c2-4.
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See Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5; Securities Act § 17(a),
15 U.S.C. 77(1).
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Exchange Act, Rules 15c1-2, 15c2-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.15c1-2, 240.15c2-2.
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See Kahn v. SEC, 291 F.2d 112, 115 (2nd Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring); Roberta Karmel, Is the
Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271 (1995) (explaining the concept as constituting an
implied representation of fair dealing based upon holding oneself out to the public as a broker or dealer).
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SEC Rel. No. 34-37619A (1996), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 85,837 (CCH); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3rd Cir. 2001) (en banc)
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Exchange Act §15(b)(4)(E); see Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Broker-Dealer Supervision:
A Troublesome Area, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 527 (1994); John H. Walsh, Right the First Time:
Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
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has invoked to contest the inappropriate influence by investment bankers over research
analysts 136 and the allocation of IPO shares to favored customers in exchange for inflated
commissions or markdowns. 137
Disclosure laws include both rules and principles. Laws governing the timing of
filing disclosure documents are rule-like (including Section 13(d)’s requirement of
disclosure at the 5% ownership level). General laws qualified by concepts of materiality
are thoroughly and consciously principles-like. 138 The SEC’s requirement that disclosure
be written in “plain-English” is a principle, although it also contains specific rule-like
components such as a prohibition against using “multiple negatives.” 139 Disclosure
concerning financial matters may bear attributes of rules or principles according to the
qualities of the related accounting provisions. The SEC offers a typology and illustrates
the categories by characterizing certain accounting provisions as rules and others
principles. 140
Toward the principles end of the securities regulation spectrum, US insider
trading laws prohibit trading while in possession of material non-public information
when occupying some capacity of trust or other special relationship. 141 As applied to
corporate officers and directors, these laws derive from state fiduciary duty principles and
become a federal violation when coupled to the anti-fraud provisions of federal securities
statutes, which state broad principles. 142 The SEC accelerated the development of these
165; In re Prudential Bache Securities, Rel. No. 34-22755, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 83,948 (1986); In re Matter of
Prudential Securities, Inc., SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 48149 (2003).
136

See Analyst Research Global Settlement, SEC (Dec. 20, 2002).
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See SEC v. Parnes, Litig. Rel. No. 16877 (Jan. 31, 2001) (proceedings concerning Datek Securities).

138

Congress, the SEC and courts have emphatically eschewed providing any bright-line content to the
concept of materiality. See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (rejecting agreement-inprinciple test to trigger materiality of preliminary merger negotiations and stating that “A bright-line rule
indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the
circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the securities
acts and Congress’ policy decisions.”); SEC, Reg. FD, Rel. No. 34-43154, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 86,319 (CCH)
(2000) (“we do not believe an appropriate answer to [the difficulty of defining materiality] is to set forth a
bright-line test, or an exclusive list of ‘material’ items”); SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (Aug. 12,
1999) (for accounting, rejecting efforts to design rules of thumb, such as a threshold measure of 5% of
earnings).
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SEC Rule 421(c) (all required prospectus information is to be written in clearly understandable prose);
Rule 421(d)(2) (no multiple negatives).
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Securities and Exchange Commission, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 on the Adoption by the US Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System
(2003) [hereinafter, “SEC, SOX 108 Study”]. The SEC’s typology is discussed in detail in the next
Section.
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See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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Four classes of persons are exposed to insider trading restrictions and hence liability: classical insiders
(based on corporate positions), temporary insiders (often professionals providing services to the
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laws in the mid-1980s when it began a vigorous campaign using the enforcement model
described as ad hoc—meaning weighted towards enforcing broad abstract principles
rather than specific detailed rules. 143
Despite the genesis of insider trading laws as principles, resulting applications can
yield expressions bearing rule-like attributes. At least in terms of their specificity and
particularity, this famously occurs when attempting to state the law governing tippertipee liability, where vagueness dissolves into a dense rule-patterned framework. 144
Based on the extent of advance notice provided, the SEC offers rule-like certainty
concerning non-business relationships that create liability risk 145 and concerning insiders
who trade for reasons not based on their inside information. 146
Some laws with principles-like qualities morph into multi-factor tests. Consider
the law forbidding market manipulation. 147 All US market manipulation laws stem, in
turn, from Section 10(b)’s principle proscribing “manipulative or deceptive devices or
contrivances.” Establishing a market manipulation violation requires proving: (1) a
misrepresentation or omission of material facts or other fraudulent device; (2) made in

corporation), tippers and tipees in the flow of information that includes such insiders and misappropriators
who essentially steal inside information. Ultimately, all these persons are restricted and liable based upon
some ultimate connection to a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968) (classic insider), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (2nd
Cir. 1987) (temporary insider); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (tipping); United States v. O’Hagan, 521
U.S. 642 (1997) (misappropriation).
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See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead At the
Next Decade, 7 YALE J. REG. 149, 156-157 (1990). The foundations of this enforcement program were
rooted in principles established two decades earlier. See In re Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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See Douglas M. Branson, Choosing the Appropriate Default Rule: Insider Trading Under State Law, 45
ALA. L. REV. 753, 759-60 (1994) (dissecting the “complex” law of tippee liability stated in SEC v. Dirks,
463 U.S. 646 (1983)); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory
and the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L. REV. 775
(1988).
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17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-2 (2006) (Rule 10b5-2, adopted in 2000, stating three non-exclusive circumstances
in which a person receiving confidential information owes a duty of trust or confidence that would trigger
application of the misappropriation theory). See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 1273 (11th Cir. 2003)
(discussing background and scope of the SEC’s rule).
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17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-1 (2006) (Rule 10b5-1 stating that insiders may trade on inside information when it
is clear that the information is not a factor in their decision to trade, as under a pre-existing plan, contract,
or good faith instruction). See Alan D. Jagolinzer, Do Insiders Trade Strategically within the SEC Rule
10b5-1 Safe Harbor? (Aug. 29, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=541502 (providing evidence
suggesting that insiders exploit the rule-like characteristics of this provision).
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Section 9 of the 1934 Act prohibits “manipulation of security prices. ”Securities Act of 1933 §9(a)(2)
(it is unlawful for any person to effect transactions “creating actual or apparent trading activity . . . or
raising or depressing [its] price . . . for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by
others”).
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connection with the sale or purchase of securities; and (3) made with scienter. 148 This
proof requires assessing multiple factors concerning the nature, timing, and context of the
trades. 149
At the ultimate principles end of the continuum are securities laws containing
anti-fraud and anti-abuse provisions. The anti-fraud provisions encompass not only
insider trading and market manipulation, but nearly every provision in federal securities
regulation. 150 As noted, various regulations authorize exemptions from registration for
certain transactions, so long as certain rule-like attributes exist. But these also provide
that stated exemptions are unavailable if a transaction (or series of them) technically
complies with the rules but otherwise is a scheme to evade the registration provisions. 151
For example, one anti-abuse principle broadly covers securities held in a form “used
primarily to circumvent” the reporting provisions of the 1934 Act. 152 Broker-dealer
regulations include principles that expose professionals to liability for violation of the
anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) even if they comply to the letter with the disclosure
requirements imposed under the customer confirmation rules. 153
In light of the numerous rules and rule-like provisions in US securities regulation,
it would be difficult to contend that such anti-fraud and anti-abuse provisions render the
law principles-based rather than rules-based. But their presence, along with principlelike provisions of materiality, also makes it difficult to contend that the system is rules-
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See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (“[Manipulation] refers generally to
practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by
artificially affecting market activity”).
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Factors include activity-related features (such as placing trades near the end of the day to exert price
pressure and trading activity based on non-economic factors) and context-related features (such as the
trader’s ownership concentration in the security and relative trading volume in it). In re James T. Patten,
SEC Initial Decisions Rel. No. 303 (Dec. 12, 2005); see also In re Vladlen “Larry” Vindman, SEC Initial
Decisions Rel. No. 285 (May 24, 2005); In re vFinance Investments, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Rel. No. 51530 (April 12, 2005) (also including failure to supervise). Apparent motivations are relevant,
like efforts that maintain a market price exceeding the minimum required for continued listing (such as
$1.00 on the Nasdaq Stock Market). In re James T. Patten, SEC Initial Decisions Rel. No. 303 (Dec. 12,
2005). Evidence of market manipulation tends to be inferred from detailed facts, such as evidence of
motive, placing orders for large numbers of shares and later canceling all or part of the order before it
cleared, and matching of purchases by one participant in a scheme with sales by another.
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See SEC Annual Report (2005), at 8 (explaining that overall enforcement program must reach across all
areas to achieve “Effective deterrence of securities fraud”) (emphasis added). The US federal securities
laws contain numerous anti-fraud provisions, including §10(b) under the 1934 Act, §17(a) under the 1933
Act, Rule 14(a)(9) governing proxy solicitations and §14(e) and Regulation 14E governing tender offers.
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17 CFR § 230 Prelim. Note 2 to Reg. S (2006) (off-shore transactions); 17 CFR § 230 Prelim. Note 6 to
Reg. D (2006); 17 CFR § 240.144A Prelim. Note 3 (2006) (qualified institutional investor exemptions); 17
CFR 230.147 Prelim. Note 3 (2006) (single-state transactions).
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17 CFR § 240.12g5-1(b)(3) (2006).
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See Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,835 F.2d 1031 (3rd Cir. 1987).
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based. 154 The individual provisions across the range are applied and interact in ways that
transform the system’s overall complexion into one defying classification using the
binary labels of rules-based or principles-based.
The foregoing discussion spanned much of the securities regulation syllabus.
Additional securities regulations likewise combine rules and principles to address many
other circumstances. While too vast to canvas fully, 155 one observes such a blend of
provisions in contexts such as proxy solicitations 156 and tender offers, which also contain
additional examples of factor tests.157 Even the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which many say is
“rules-based,” 158 also can be read to exhibit an underlying basis in principles, making it
plausibly “principles-based.” 159 Notable critics of the Act as “rules-based” are
accounting promulgators, whom the Act implicitly blamed for making US GAAP “rulesbased.” 160 As the next section shows, the Act’s implicit charge that GAAP is rules-based
also is of dubious validity.
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Provisions concerning liability and defenses often hinge on principles too, such as scienter, knowledge,
reasonable belief or investigation, privity, loss causation, and transaction causation.
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This discussion has not mentioned the Trust Indenture Act, the Investment Company Act, the
Investment Advisers Act, or the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. But a study of these laws and related
regulations reveal a mixture of rules and principles that likewise defy tidy classification of the overall
systems as rules-based or principles-based.
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Proxy solicitation provisions, contained in Regulation 14A, involve (a) principles-like matters such as
the definition of solicitation, exemptions, and safe harbors. (b) specific rule-like disclosure requirements
for proxy statements, filing requirements, forms of proxy, (c) shareholder proposal provisions and grounds
for exclusion which blend a mixture of rules and principles and (d) elaborate provisions encompassing the
entire context in which proxy solicitations proceed, addressing the special roles of bankers, brokers and
dealers.
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See Wellman v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating the test); Hanson Trust PLC
v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 56-57 (2nd Cir. 1985) (reciting but rejecting the test); SEC v. Carter Hawley
Hale Stores Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the test). As with proxy solicitations, tender offer
regulations encompass a full range of provisions spanning the spectrum from such principles to detailed
rules concerning matters of filing, dissemination, disclosure, timing and other communications and
activities occurring during the tender offer period.
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E.g., Wright, The Ambitious and the Greedy, supra note ___, at 73 (denigrating “rules-based” approach
of Sarbanes-Oxley); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties,
30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1195 (2004) (Sarbanes-Oxley “adopts a wholly novel, rules-based
approach to corporate governance”).
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See Jeffrey Lipshaw, Sarbanes-Oxley, Jurisprudence, Game Theory, Insurance and Kant: Toward a
Moral Theory of Good Governance, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1083 (2004); see also supra note ___ (example of
the Act’s principles-like requirement that companies provide disclosure on a “rapid and current” basis).
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Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 61 (2003) (FASB
board member asserting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains “detailed and prescriptive corporate
governance at the federal level” being “markedly different from the principles-based approach that has
historically been taken at the state level” and warning that this atmosphere will, in turn, stoke demand for
more rules in accounting).
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3. Accounting — Rhetoric holds that international financial reporting standards
(IFRS) are principles-based and US GAAP is rules-based. 161 As with frequent
descriptions of Delaware corporate law and common descriptions of US federal securities
regulation, these characterizations are overstated. True, for given accounting topics, US
GAAP employs bright-line rules (often numerical thresholds) while IFRS states a
principle (using relatively vague concepts such as substantial or control). But both
regimes ultimately show a combination of these attributes, preventing a conclusion that
one is principles-based or rules-based in any meaningful sense.
Leases are a common example for which US GAAP favors rules and IFRS favors
principles. 162 In both systems, leases are divided into two classes (capital and operating)
and receive different treatment: costs and receipts under operating leases are recognized
when incurred and those under capital leases are allocated over multiple periods. IFRS
leases are capitalized when an arrangement transfers substantially all the risks and
rewards of ownership; US GAAP leases are capitalized when one of four specific criteria
exist, including a lease term that is 75% or more of the item’s useful life or the present
value of lease payments is 90% or more of its fair value.
Although one may quarrel over the relative appeal of these approaches, it is a
stretch to infer from this example—or even an assortment of kindred examples—that US
GAAP is rules-based or IFRS is principles-based, for numerous contrary examples could
be given. Consider a paired example arising in the context of debates on two different
but related accounting topics: callable debt and refinancing of debt. Both pose a question
of classification as short-term or long-term debt, with considerable consequences for
important financial ratios and an enterprise’s financial condition and appearance. Longterm debt that is callable may better be seen as short-term debt; short-term debt to be
refinanced on a long-term basis may better be seen as long-term debt. How should the
classification be made?
Short-term debt to be refinanced as long-term debt is so reclassified if the enterprise
intends to complete a refinancing, evidenced by an agreement with specified
characteristics. 163 When this provision was adopted, a dissenter from it complained that
its “intention” test was too open-ended (too principles-based in today’s jargon). Callable
debt is to be classified as short-term debt if due on demand within one year or if, because
of debtor breach of the agreement, the creditor has the right to accelerate it (unless the
lender has waived its acceleration right). 164 When adopted, dissenters from this provision
complained that it was too restrictive (too rules-based in today’s jargon). They said it
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See supra note ___ (citing sources).
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See, e.g., Rebecca Toppe Shortridge & Mark Myring, Defining Principles-Based Accounting Standards,
CPA J. (2004), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/804/essentials/p34.htm.
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FASB, SFAS No. 6, Classification of Short-Term Obligations Expected to Be Refinanced, ¶ 11. The
characteristics are essentially an expiration date beyond one year, limited lender cancellation rights, no
covenants that are being breached and the lender having capacity to consummate the financing.
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FASB, SFAS No. 78, Classification of Obligations that are Callable by the Creditor, ¶ 5.
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was a “further step to supplant judgment in financial reporting with arbitrary rules.” 165
These provisions endure in US GAAP, side-by-side. Generalizing systemic bases from
such individual examples is thus unlikely to produce reliable characterizations.
US GAAP on derivatives contains excruciating complexity spanning hundreds of
pages, with detailed treatment specified depending on whether a transaction is a hedge or
not and, if a hedge, a cash flow hedge, foreign currency hedge, or other kind. 166 On the
other hand, US GAAP is exactly as dense as IFRS, which is literally a copy of the US
GAAP provisions (plus an additional 351 pages of implementation guidance). 167 Even
though both systems exhibit this rule-like quality, moreover, the provisions also direct
classifying a financial instrument as a hedge based on managerial intention in using the
instrument. 168 That kind of vague test could justify describing accounting for derivative
securities as principles-like. 169
A widely-misunderstood accounting provision at the heart of the Enron debacle
may explain why so many people facilely believe that US GAAP is rules-based. The
provision concerns the definition of a subsidiary for purposes of preparing consolidated
financial statements that include such entities. US GAAP defined this as ownership of at
least a majority of the voting shares of another entity. 170 IFRS defines subsidiary for this
purpose as control of the other entity. The concepts get at the same point—ability to
influence the other entity so that the parent’s financial report should reflect its investee’s
financial position and risk. But “majority” is a rule (it is not vague) and “control” is a
principle (its use of factors in addition to arithmetic creates vagueness).
The confusion about Enron related the well-known provision on subsidiaries to an
obscure provision concerning special purpose entities (SPEs). To avoid consolidation of
an SPE (to obtain “off-balance sheet treatment”) meant satisfying the provisions of
consolidation accounting (a majority of the SPE’s equity held by third parties), plus
arcane provisions applied to SPEs that required at least 3% of the SPE’s total capital
(equity plus debt) to be equity. This reduces associated risk to the owners by capping the
ratio of debt-to-equity at 33:1. It does not change the basic consolidation provision
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FASB, SFAS No. 78 (dissenting opinions).
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See SFAS No. 115.
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Compare PATRICK R. DELANEY, ET AL., WILEY GAAP (2004), at 161-204 (US GAAP) with BARRY J.
EPSTEIN & ABBAS ALI MIRZA, WILEY IAS (2004), at 159-201 (IAS); see Nobes, Rules-Based Standards,
supra note ___, at n. 13 (“The IAS No. 39 file at the IASB records that the project director . . . considered
12 FASB Statements, 9 FASB Technical Bulletins, 7 APB Opinions, 19 AICPA Statements of Position,
and 109 EITF consensuses”).
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See IAS No. 39, ¶ 9; SFAS No. 115, ¶¶ 7 & 12.
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Schipper, supra note ___ (FASB board member emphasizing that US GAAP on derivatives ultimately is
based on a fundamental principle of managerial intent).
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A post-Enron revision expands the concept to require consolidation of so-called variable interest entities
despite the basic rule. FASB Interpretation No. 46, Variable Interest Entities.
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which requires more than 50% of the equity to be held by third parties. Yet many
commentators suggested that SPEs could be excluded so long as a mere 3% of their total
equity was held by third parties. 171 That would vitiate the basic consolidation provision
and it is not the case. 172 It is absurd to allege that such a rule is to blame for the Enron
debacle; it is also misleading to argue that it illustrates that US GAAP is rules-based. 173
A common example of principles in accounting, under both US GAAP and IFRS,
concerns loss contingencies. Liabilities for contingent events and circumstances must be
recognized or disclosed but uncertainty makes it difficult to prescribe associated rules ex
ante. So accounting relies on principles of probability and magnitude. 174 Even so, in
application, participants seek to specify the meaning of probability and magnitude by
descriptions such as “more likely than not” or assigning numerical measures
benchmarked using other accounting concepts, such as materiality.
At the ultimate principles-end of the continuum, in both US GAAP and IFRS, are
a series of broad general accounting precepts. Both systems require a fair presentation
and emphasize substance-over-form. US GAAP also is based on an overarching concept
171

See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate
Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 329, 337 (2003)
(“Enron would create an SPE and ‘buy’ 97 percent of the equity in the entity in exchange for giving the
entity some illiquid asset of highly uncertain value that Enron wanted to clear off its balance sheet. For
SEC/GAAP purposes, this arrangement would permit Enron to move the asset off its balance sheet and
even show a profit on its sale, so long as 3 percent of the equity in the SPE was owned by independent,
outside investors.”) (citing Victor Fleischer, Enron’s Dirty Tax Secret: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop,
94 TAX NOTES 1045 (2002)); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groputhink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1233 at n. 4 (2003) (“Firms using SPEs are not required to consolidate these entities on
their financial statements providing that (1) an outside investor funds at least three percent of the SPE’s
equity (2) the transferor does not ‘control’ the SPE, and (3) the transferor gives an opinion concerning the
‘bankruptcy remote’ status of SPE”); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle
with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1239 (2003) (“If Enron could not find another outside investor to
hold at least a three percent equity interest in JEDI, Enron would have to ‘consolidate’ JEDI on its balance
sheet . . . .”).
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See Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman, FASB, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and
Consumer Prot. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Feb. 14, 2002). Indeed, when the equity level is
that low, 100% of it must be held by third parties. Id. See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Catastrophic Financial
Failures: Enron and More, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 423, 428 (2004) (“Generally accepted accounting
principles provided that a company doing business with an SPE may treat the SPE as an independent,
outside entity if two conditions are met: ‘(1) an owner independent of the company must make a
substantive equity investment of at least [three percent] of the SPE's assets, and that [three percent] must
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SPE’”) (citing William C. Powers, Jr. et al., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee
of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 4 (Feb. 1, 2002)); Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron Decision: Closing
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controlled directly or indirectly by Enron. Second, an equity investor, also independent of Enron, must put
at risk at least three percent of the SPE’s capital.”).
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of decision usefulness. 175 Both systems are imbued with conventions of aspirational
qualities, including prudence and conservatism. All these may be denominated as
principles. And the preceding illustrations—rules, principles and a mix—interact with
these principles: all are simultaneously subject to the principles and influence their
meaning.
The broad principles animating US GAAP lead a minority to claim that US
GAAP is principles-based. 176 The principles are stated in a conceptual framework called
Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFACs). Promulgators use these as a
guide when adopting accounting provisions for specific subjects. While not formally part
of GAAP, the SFACs provide its foundation. 177 The most important of these are noted in
the preceding paragraph (to provide a fair presentation and substance-over-form); they
also include that financial statements should be both relevant and reliable. 178
The case that US GAAP is “principles-based” is just as plausible as the more
common claim that it is “rules-based.” Neither is clearly correct. For example, an SEC
study classified US GAAP’s elements as rules-based, 179 principles-based 180 and
principles-only 181 (and left some unclassified, including contingencies), thus finding a
mix. True, many US GAAP provisions exhibit a rule-like quality compared to IFRS—
like leases and subsidiaries. But there is also a mixture in IFRS, which also contains
many rules, such as those pertaining to derivative securities. 182
A further consideration in assessing the character of any accounting system
concerns the scope of discretion reposed in targeted actors. Both US GAAP and IFRS
offer numerous alternative approaches to accounting for a single transaction in many
contexts. Choices exist in mundane settings such as inventory and depreciation and in
more advanced subjects such as employee benefit plans and amortization of debt. While
difficult to measure which system offers more choices, it is well-known that the political
process of approving IFRS entails contending viewpoints and a supermajority approval
175
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requirement that has led IFRS in many contexts to offer menus rather than definite
prescriptions. 183 This feature may tempt one to characterize it as principles-based. Yet
US GAAP likewise offers extensive menus.
Consider finally the SEC’s enforcement actions in accounting. 184 Areas most
susceptible to misconduct—measured by the SEC’s enforcement action distribution—are
among the most principles-like provisions in accounting: revenue recognition 185 and
expense recognition 186 along with a sizable number of cases in the likewise principlesrich contexts of asset impairment, inventory, business combinations and restructurings. 187
These data strongly support the conclusion that it is a mistake to say that US GAAP is
rules-based.
*
*
*
To summarize, accounting systems, like corporate law and securities regulation,
defy tidy classification as rules-based or principles-based. This review of selected legal
and accounting systems supports the conclusion that it is at least imprecise to denominate
any of the described systems as principles-based or rules-based. This does not prove that
it is impossible to conceive of or design any system of law as rules-based or principlesbased. But as to these subjects, at least, doing so seems doubtful, as the following
discussion suggests.
B. Proposed Systems
Theorists and lawmakers may consciously attempt to tilt a legal or accounting
system in favor of one end of the rules-principles continuum or the other. But as the
following discussion affirms, doing so is more difficult than it may seem, at least in
corporate law, securities regulation and accounting.
1. Emerging Economies and Corporate Law — Professors Black and Kraakman
draw lessons from their experience developing corporate law for post-Soviet Russia to
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fashion an intensely rule-rich system of corporate law. 188 The theory is the desperate
need for certainty, desperate because of its absence in the Soviet regime upon which
Russia was forced to build its emerging economy. 189 The model helps to show that even
the most conscious effort to design a system of corporate law using rules, written from
scratch, cannot escape including significant provisions recognizable as principles.
They refer to this as a “self-enforcing” model. It is “self-enforcing” in that its
elements are designed to rely minimally on administrative or judicial enforcement—
corporate participants following the provisions can enforce them internally. This is
important for emerging economies because they lack a legal, economic and social
infrastructure that supports enforcement of corporate law. The main feature of the selfenforcing model is an emphasis on the use of bright-line rules instead of principles. 190
However, Professors Black and Kraakman recognize that their resulting model is not
purely based on bright-line rules because, as the following summary indicates, this is
impossible.
The self-enforcing model imposes specific mandates by statute. Rules provide for
supermajority shareholder voting on designated transactions. 191 Shareholder consent is
required for an asset sale involving 50% or more of the company’s book value (not the
typical US requirement triggered by a sale of “all or substantially all” assets). 192
Shareholder takeout rights arise when a third party acquires ownership of 30% of the
voting equity. The model protects shareholder voting rights by a one-share, one-vote rule
to prevent insiders from accumulating voting power disproportionate to economic stakes.
This protection is reinforced by allowing shareholders to nominate directors or make
other proposals. The model also mandates disclosure, confidential voting and cumulative
voting.
At the board level, the model requires certain features, such as audit committees.
To protect the value of cumulative voting, the model requires minimum board size and
prohibits staggered director terms. A set portion of directors must be independent of the
corporation. These directors are entrusted with exercising specified power over
designated extraordinary transactions, including self-interested transactions. For selfinterested transactions, the model follows closely the process provisions found in
contemporary US corporate law statutes—approval by fully-informed, disinterested
directors or shareholders. 193
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Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV.
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While the foregoing examples show maximum use of bright-line rules, numerous
other contexts require principles. A good example of the need for principles concerns
third-parties. Their rights are protected mostly by contract in the US, but contractual
protection may be weak tea in developing economies lacking requisite enforcement
infrastructure. 194 The self-enforcing model restricts corporations from distributing assets
to shareholders in derogation of third-party interests through dividends and repurchases.
These are permitted only so long as, after the distribution, the corporation can pay its
debts when due and assets exceed liabilities.195 Thus, the model polices both by applying
the Model Act-type restrictions, which I earlier called principles-like in contrast to the
dense rule-like Delaware provisions. 196
In addition to relying upon Model Act-type principles, these distribution
restrictions are limited because they police only dividends and repurchases. Corporations
are inventive in distributing assets to shareholders using other devices in derogation of
third-party rights. To police these, the self-enforcing model relies upon vague general
principles found in US fraudulent conveyance law. That is, “a transaction is improper if
(i) the company does not receive equivalent value, and (ii) the company fails an assetbased or liquidity-based solvency test after the transaction.” 197 Professors Black and
Kraakman recognize that this is a principle not a rule, but note that this is the best that
can be done. 198
Appraisal rights offer another example of the inevitable need for principles. In
the Black-Kraakman model, appraisal rights are required and apply to a broader range of
transactions than in US corporate law. 199 As in US law, implementation of the appraisal
remedy, even when contours are stated with rule-like particularly, requires judicial
analysis using principles, including principles of financial valuation. 200 Professors Black
and Kraakman appreciate these limitations but find that there is no alternative.201
As a final example, rather than endorse typical US style provisions concerning
self-interested transactions, the Black-Kraakman model provides a specific rule that
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independent directors must apply when voting on such transactions. 202 The model favors
such a specific directive because it relieves directors from struggling with questions of
financial fairness. This is important for developing economies that lack norms that are
prevalent in developed countries, where people understand financial fairness in terms of
the relationship between price and value.
Although this achieves the desired rule-like feature, the explanation reflects an
important challenge facing the self-enforcing model generally. All provisions depend
ultimately on the production of norms, especially a norm of following rules. Without
norms, why would anyone follow the rules? Without adherence to rules, how can
productive corporate norms form? It is possible that bright-line rules alone can generate
compliance norms. But it seems more likely that a system that combines rules with
principles will do so. 203
Indeed, while Professors Black and Kraakman outline many structural features of
corporate law, they do not engage questions ordinarily entangled with fiduciary duties,
other than self-interested transactions. Thus, for good reason, their model does not
address hostile takeover bids (they are absent or rare in emerging economies). The selfenforcing model does not consider problems that arise under the corporate opportunity
doctrine. Adding these features to the model would confirm the need for principles in
creating a corporate law from scratch. 204 The scholars rightly opt for the term selfenforcing model rather than rules-based model, for the prescription shows the
impossibility of fashioning a corporate law system that can fairly be called rules-based.
2. Canada and Securities Regulation — Lawmakers in the Canadian province of
British Columbia (BC) are more emphatic than Professors Black and Kraakman in
announcing that they have drafted a principles-based system of securities regulation.
They propose this as an alternative to what they see as a Canadian trend, led by Ontario,
to follow the US “rules-based” model. The BC lawmakers contended that their “new
approach leaves behind the over-use of detailed and prescriptive rules in favour of an
202

Id. (independent directors shall approve an interested transaction “only if the company receives
consideration, in exchange for property or services delivered by the company, that is worth no less than the
market value of the property or services, and the company pays consideration, in exchange for property or
services, that does not exceed the market value of the property or services”).

203
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outcomes-based approach founded on time-tested principles of investor protection:
disclosure to investors and the regulation of dealers and brokers.” 205
The proposed BC Act strives to express securities regulation in broad general
terms, but many rule-like features appear. In outline, the Act contains 12 parts, each
divided into numerous sections and half divided first into multiple divisions then into
numerous sub-sections. 206 Examples of provisions falling toward the principles end of
the continuum include laws governing market participant conduct. The Act states general
prohibitions (no engaging in manipulation, fraud or misrepresentation—as defined
elsewhere with greater specificity) and then bans unfair practices (but must define these
in a series of specific statements: no unreasonable pressure, no taking advantage of
others, and no imposing inequitable terms).
The Act’s definition of “material information” is principles-like, as in the US and
elsewhere. The Act defines material information as “information relating to the business,
operations or securities of an issuer that would reasonably be expected to significantly
affect the value or market price of the issuer or a security of the issuer.” 207 The Act uses
the term material information 22 times. The Act supplies a different but parallel
definition of “significant information” applicable to mutual funds. The Act uses the two
terms together in numerous contexts but separately when prescribing prospectus
disclosure requirements as between mutual funds and other issuers. 208 Principles alone
are insufficient to implement that distinction.
Several examples of provisions falling toward the rules end of the continuum
appear. The Act’s definitions section contains tight statements of the terms adviser,
affiliate, associate, derivative, insider, market participant (listing 15 different categories
of persons), offering and trade. Subsequent sections contain specific definitions of
additional terms. The definition of security lists seven categories of instruments. Given
historical experience with novel and unanticipated instruments, one wonders whether this
definition of security, which in any event is rule-like not principle-like, would be
sufficient to cover future circumstances. 209 The effort to define misrepresentation is
particularly cumbersome, more nearly evincing attributes of rules than of principles. 210
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See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946); see, e.g., Shanah D. Glick, Note, Are Viatical
Settlements Securities within the Regulatory Control of the Securities Act of 1933?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 957
(1993).
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It is: “(a) in relation to an issuer (i) an untrue statement of material information or significant
information, (ii) the failure to disclose material information or significant information that is required to be
disclosed, or (iii) the omission of material information or significant information from a statement, if that
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All the BC Act’s provisions concerning registration and offerings are stated in
vague terms, exhibiting principles-like features. Even so, they also contain rules and
many rely upon the securities commission to provide additional regulation. Thus
registration provisions require registration or else a participant cannot trade or advise (a
rule). 211 They must apply for registration (a rule). The securities commission can grant
applications conditionally or restrictively (a principle). The offering provisions prohibit
offerings absent filing and receiving a receipt for a prospectus (a rule). The prospectus
must be “in the required form” (a rule, although the statute does not specify the form,
presumably leaving this to the commission, which could use rules, principles or both). 212
The Act’s insider trading provisions also show effort to articulate pure principles
but equally succumb, through pressure for certainty, to rule-like expression. Thus
insiders must “within the prescribed time” (a rule) “file a report in the required form”
(another rule). 213
The commission, again, is to establish the prescription and
requirements. Subsequent insider reports are required under stated circumstances
(rules). 214 The law bans insider trading and expressly states that this includes tipping.
These provisions require defining the additional term “connected person.” 215 This is a
dense and complex definition bearing qualities of a rule, not a principle. 216 The stated
ban on insider trading is likewise dense, resembling a synthesis of pre-Act case law or
enforcement actions—less a rule or a principle and more nearly a summary of prior
applications.

information is necessary to prevent the statement from being false or misleading in the circumstances, or
(b) in any other circumstance, a statement about something that a reasonable investor would consider
important (i) in making a decision to trade a security, or (ii) in relation to a trading or advising relationship
with a person, if the statement is untrue or omits information necessary to prevent the statement from being
false or misleading in the circumstances.” BC Securities Bill, supra note ___,
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Id. “Connected person is, in relation to an issuer, (a) an insider, officer, employee, affiliate or associate
of the issuer; (b) a person that is making or proposing to make a takeover bid for the securities of the issuer;
(c) a person that is proposing to (i) become a party to a reorganization or business combination with the
issuer, or (ii) acquire a substantial portion of the property of the issuer; (d) a person engaging in or
proposing to engage in any business or professional activity with or on behalf of the issuer or with or on
behalf of a person referred to in paragraph (b) or (c); (e) an insider, officer, employee, affiliate or associate
of a person referred to in paragraph (b), (c) or (d); (f) a person with inside information, if the information
was obtained at a time when the person was a connected person under paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), or
(g) a person that obtained inside information from another person (i) who, at the time, was a connected
person under this definition, including this paragraph, and (ii) whom the person knew or reasonably should
have known was a connected person.”
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So notwithstanding conscious ambitions to create principles-based securities
regulation, the BC approach does not quite live up to the billing. True, the Act contains
extensive provisions written in principle-like fashion. But it cannot escape providing an
express dose of rules, including specific action requirements, concept definitions and
efforts at specification associated with rules. It also leaves many details to be written by
the securities commission—meaning that the full-blown system of securities regulation
likely would have many more rules than appear in the Act. Once applied in practice and
allowed to interact, moreover, the result will be more rules yet and a systemic character
that defies classification using the binary terminology of rules-based or principles-based.
3. United States and Accounting — The Congress and the SEC have adopted the
rhetoric of principles-based systems as well. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC
to conduct a “study on the adoption by the US financial reporting system of a principlesbased accounting system.” 217 This directive implicitly suggests that the current US
accounting system is “rules-based,” a mistaken but widely-shared belief. 218
In its study, the SEC identified the typical trade-offs of rules versus principles. It
then came down squarely on the side of promoting a principles-based system, although it
dubbed it an objectives-oriented approach. Consistent with conceptions outlined in Part I
of this Article, the SEC observed that accounting provisions reside along a continuum
according to their “degrees of specificity,” “ranging from the abstract, at one end, to the
very specific at the other.” 219 The SEC also denominated a class of principles-only
provisions, defined as “high-level [provisions] with little if any operational guidance.” 220
The classic example of the latter is the concept of a reasonable speed in driving
regulations. Such “principle-only” provisions require exercising judgment without a
reliable framework for doing so—and risk ad hoc enforcement arbitrariness.
The SEC minted and endorsed the concept of an “objectives-oriented” approach
to assert that resulting provisions would “land solidly between the two ends of this
spectrum.” 221 Falling in line with contemporary global vocabulary, the SEC opined that
an objectives-orientation would best be achieved using “principles-based” provisions.
The SEC explains that, in contrast to rules-based systems, a principles-based
system uses concise statements of principle with the related objectives incorporated as an
integral part. Ideally, its provisions contain no or few exceptions, a modicum of
guidance, and no bright-line tests and they are derived from an underlying coherent
conceptual framework. 222 Systems with these attributes are objectives-oriented because:
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application entails fulfilling the objective and so minimizes strategic evasion; articulation
entails coherence across the regulatory terrain; it eschews exceptions that produce
inconsistencies; and it omits bright-lines that lead to different regulatory consequences
for slightly different fact patterns. 223
Although the SEC position is superficially appealing and forceful, some
perspective is in order. As a background matter, there was an apparent dichotomy
between complying with GAAP and providing a fair financial presentation. 224 With
some fanfare, the SEC addressed this possible dichotomy after Enron Corp. imploded by
saying that if complying with GAAP does not produce a fair presentation, then
compliance with GAAP is subordinated to promoting a fair presentation. 225 In such
cases, GAAP must be overridden. However, this stance threatened the existing financial
reporting system, which for decades had assumed that complying with GAAP would
yield a fair presentation. 226
If too rule-bound, compliance with the GAAP rule-book would impair the
possibility of meeting the fairly-presents principle. A crisis loomed: if the widely-held
assumption of US GAAP as rules-excessive was accurate, then it had to be reinvented—
post haste. True, it might be possible to rehabilitate the relationship between GAAP and
fair presentation through techniques such as presumptions or qualifications or scope
limitations. But at a broad level, if complying with rule-bound GAAP meant absence of
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See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2nd Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970); James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics for
Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 301, 319-20 (2003) (discussing Simon in current context).
225

SEC, SOX 108 STUDY, supra note ___; see also SEC, CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN COMPANIES’
QUARTERLY AND ANNUAL REPORTS, RELEASE NO. 33-8124 (Aug. 28, 2002) (auditors’ certification is not
limited to whether financial statements conform to GAAP); see also Floyd Norris, An Old Case Is
Returning to Haunt Auditors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at C1 (noting how the SEC Chairman has been
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of inadequate disclosure. See In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co. 11 SEC 975 (1942). Some cases from the
1970s, in addition to United States v. Simon, supra, did so as well. E.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
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a fair presentation and fair presentation is privileged, then GAAP can become
functionally irrelevant.
Rhetoric notwithstanding, the assumption of GAAP’s rule-bound nature was
false. The SEC found that existing US GAAP is a combination of rules and principles.
While expressing a modest appreciation for the principles end of the spectrum, the SEC
declared the existing mixture to be substantially effective, and re-labeled it an objectivesoriented system. The SEC concluded that, under such a system, there should be limited
need to use GAAP overrides. Complying with objectives-based GAAP yields financial
statements that are fairly presented. This conclusion thus resolved what otherwise
loomed as a crisis: that US GAAP would have to be scrapped if it could not satisfy the
fair presentation principle.
The SEC’s elaborate study of the rules-principles dichotomy shows the
dichotomy’s falsity. The SEC ultimately concluded that US GAAP is a mixture of
principles and rules and, despite a modest gesture encouraging greater use of principles
when possible, designates neither as inherently superior. Instead, it embraces what it
believes to be a hybrid, which it calls an “objectives-oriented” system. It boils down to a
different name for the prevailing variety of rules and principles, all intended to promote
financial statements that “fairly present” financial condition and performance.
This resolution of the false dichotomy is correct and suggests that the struggle
was more cathartic than substantive. The issue is not whether a rules-based system or a
principles-based system is superior (since they probably do not exist). It is whether, for a
given situation, a rule or principle is superior. That depends, in turn, on the factors
commonly identified as trade-offs (such as certainty versus context) and on how rules and
principles are applied and how they interact. The ideal form varies across subject matters
within a system—in corporate law, securities regulation and accounting. The question is
indeed one of objectives.
III. THEORIES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RHETORIC
Many countries around the world—plus Delaware judges and their apologists in
corporate law, British Columbia in securities regulation and even Congress and the SEC
when addressing accounting—are invoking the terminology of principles-based systems.
The foregoing discussion counsels skepticism about whether such systems are possible,
let alone desirable. At best, it may be possible, within the universe of rules and
principles, to weight a system heavily towards principles (or rules). Why leaders appeal
to this characterization is a curiosity that the following discussion explores. It considers
three possibilities summarized in the Introduction: the regulatory, ethical and political
hypotheses.
A. Regulatory
A possible explanation for widespread talk of principles-based systems is to
support regulatory resistance to otherwise powerful forces generating rules. In many
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contexts in recent years, the trend has been towards rules and away from principles. 227
Offsetting these trends by emphasizing principles can promote more cautious compliance
attitudes among regulated actors.
1. Trends Favoring Rules — Five trends favoring rules can be identified. First,
people seek certainty, especially in financial markets. Risk-assessment tools increasingly
enable defining and measuring a range of risks, from interest and currency rate
fluctuations and commodity price changes to political and weather hazards. 228 This
ability to measure such a variety of risks stokes an appetite to measure regulatory and
enforcement risk too. The perceived certainty that accompanies rules compared to
principles leads to demand for rules.
Second, the “new governance” paradigm within administrative law envisions
regulators and compliers increasingly participating together in promulgation exercises. 229
The administrative state has evolved into one of open government, collaborative
governance, and extensive private standard setting. 230 In such regulatory negotiations, it
is not surprising that resulting articulations would be less vague, with constituents
asserting needs for qualifications, exceptions and other features of rules. 231 When the
process increases the prospect of regulatory capture, the probability of producing more
rules than principles arises.
A third factor driving rules-proliferation is the ascendancy of “interpretive
textualism.” This refers to the practice of emphasizing literal expressions, especially by
judges, when interpreting statutory or regulatory language. It resists infusing those
materials with penumbral principles. 232 Legislators and regulators may respond with
increasing care and attention to selected words, entailing a quest to squeeze out
vagueness when drafting that yields rules. This can, in turn, become a part of legal
culture and lead practitioners to follow suit. 233
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75 COLO. L. REV. 115 (2004).
48

Fourth, increasing specialization and fragmentation create incentives among
proprietors and professionals to claim expertise and regulators to claim turf. 234 The value
of rents that such groups can claim is greater when specialized rules govern rather than
broad general principles. Such specialization and fragmentation arise in securities
markets because old-fashioned industrial issuers differ markedly from mutual funds and
these both differ from hedge funds; common stock and straight-debt differ markedly from
preferred stock, call or put options, asset-backed debt, strips, and derivatives. Rules
result.
Fifth, professional advisors participating in transactions demand rules, not
principles. Sometimes they need support from specific rulebooks to cite when
encouraging clients to take conservative or prudential approaches. 235 Litigation risk
bolsters this demand, especially evident in accounting, where auditors demand rules
rather than principles.236 Across all settings where risks and pressures of rent-seeking are
high—whether for those seeking clean audit letters, legal opinions or no-action letters—
rules that limit or eliminate discretion help to deflect such appeals. 237
2. A Need for Principles — These impressive forces may generate more complex
and technical rules than is ideal with such volume that weakens the weight or vividness
of associated principles. When more rules are produced and fewer or weaker principles
are available to mediate them, the traditionally accepted trade-offs between rules and
principles may be upset and the benefits of their iterative relationship impaired. An
excess of rules makes it easier to treat rules as blueprints to achieve absurd results. A
useful response to excessive rule production is a regulatory emphasis on principles, in
fact and in rhetoric. This inclination provides a plausible explanation for prevailing
inclinations to celebrate “principles-based systems” of law or accounting.
In this view, a “principles-based system” has a broad regulatory enforcement
power able to police not just compliance with specific rules but fulfillment of broad
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general principles. It does so by equipping regulatory agencies that combine rule-making
authority with enforcement power to emphasize principles rather than rules to bolster
their enforcement arsenals. 238 This capability can elicit greater cautiousness among
regulated actors and, by making this vivid, reduce temptation to exploit rules when doing
so produces absurd results.
To illustrate, compare the rules-heavy self-enforcing model of corporate law with
the principles-rich British Columbia securities regulation proposal and principlesencouraging SEC study on US GAAP. 239 The self-enforcing model is designed to
minimize the role of external enforcement in favor of internal enforcement. To that end,
it relies as much as possible on rules. The British Columbia proposal and SEC study
reflect the opposite appetite. They favor principles. That approach takes seriously the
possibility of expansive external enforcement powers based on those principles.
Regulators periodically rely on principles in their enforcement arsenal to address
discrete bouts of deviance in which rules either do not exist or are not clearly
applicable. 240 For example, the SEC used principles to launch its campaign against
insider trading in the mid-1980s. 241 It did so to address plagues associated with junk
bonds in the early 1990s and, along with states attorney general, research analysts and
mutual fund market timing in the early 2000s. 242 It used principles in enforcement to
address novel problems arising from technological innovation and political change at the
dawns of the Internet 243 and globalization. 244
These examples of principles-based enforcement support the regulatory
hypothesis as an enforcement-expanding device, but simultaneously show a descriptive
weakness in this hypothesis to explain the recent rise of principles-based vocabulary: they
238

See ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION (1982); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Agency Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965); Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
239

See supra text accompanying notes ___-___.

240

See William R. McLucas, J. Lynn Taylor, & Susan A. Mathews, A Practitioner’s Guide to the SEC’s
Investigative and Enforcement Process, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 53 at n.74 (1997).

241

See supra text accompanying notes ___-___.

242

Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11
CONN. INS. L. J. 107 (2004).

243

E.g., SEC v. Spencer, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,856 (Mar. 29, 1996) (Internet solicitation of investors
promising 50% returns); SEC v. Frye, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,720 (Nov. 15, 1995) (Internet solicitation of
investor promising risk-free profits); SEC v. Odulo, SEC Lit. Rel. Nos. 14,591 (Aug. 7, 1995), and 14,616
(Aug. 24, 1995) (Internet solicitation promising 20% return).

244

See In re Candies, Inc., Sec. Act Rel. No. 7,263 (Feb. 21, 1996) (cease-and-desist proceeding against
law firm assisting in scheme to violate registration requirements by distributing abroad unregistered stock
that was promptly resold into US); SEC v. Scorpion Technologies, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,814 (Feb. 9,
1996) (injunction to stop illegal Regulation S offering of stock in 20 countries).

50

show that such discretionary enforcement always exists as an option. A difference may
be how, in the given examples, deviance was isolated and not closely connected to extant
rules. In contrast, the Enron era created a perception that too many rules bred pervasive
“creative compliance”—technical adherence to rules but lacking fidelity to their spirit. 245
As an example, people could design deals that met clearly applicable accounting rules
expressed in numerical thresholds, such as 3% or 50%, despite absurd results that
impaired the principle of fair presentation. 246
However, the regulatory hypothesis faces other weaknesses as a descriptive
matter. First, the rhetoric about “principles-based systems” is stronger than a mere shift
in regulatory strategy. It does not speak to a balance between rules and principles but
pronounces the emphatic superiority of principles. Second, while the explanation may
appear plausible for the SEC and British Columbia, it carries little credibility in the case
of Delaware, which is notoriously reluctant to impose liability on directors of its
corporations. 247
Third, regulators responded to the recent debacles with new rules as well as new
principles and rhetoric. For example, in response to the Enron chairman Ken Lay’s
disingenuous defense that he did not know the details of Enron’s financial statements, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act prescribed a rule that corporate officers must certify that they know
the details of financial statements; 248 and in response to the era’s widespread accounting
shenanigans, the SEC adopted rules to police the use of non-GAAP financial measures
and off-balance sheet financing arrangements. 249
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The regulatory hypothesis poses two additional difficulties as a normative matter.
Both arise from how this strategy can tip the balance unduly in the principles direction.
First, this can induce excessively cautious compliance outlooks that impair the benefits of
rules (which, in this context, could include deterring desirable risk-taking). 250 Second, a
determined enforcement preference to focus on principles instead of rules could backfire
when incongruent with accepted notions of fairness and legitimacy.
B. Ethical
A second possibility is that the rhetoric of “principles-based systems” is part of a
more general exhortation. What Enron-type scandals showed was not a failure of rules
but the failure of a different set of principles: ethics. The global embrace of principlesbased systems may be intended less as a description of the relative specificity or ex ante
content of provisions as between rules and principles and more of an appeal to ethics.
Principles-based regulation may be a call to ethical principles. This would also explain
why the global rhetoric uses the term principles rather than the term standards so
prevalent in the legal literature. 251 If so, labels may matter more than some think. 252
1. Hortatory — The rise of enthusiasm for principles-based systems corresponds
to the post-Enron discourse that lamented laxity in business ethics. 253 Some worried that
professionalism had diminished in favor of pure profit-maximization and notions of the
public good and public service among the professions needed reaffirmation. 254 The
discourse exhibited a quest to restore a heightened sense of business and professional
ethics.
The rhetoric of principles-based systems may be a by-product of this quest. This
may be so because, while regulatory tools can contribute to promoting ethical norms,
they cannot do so alone. 255 Consider again the practice of creative compliance: literal
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obedience to law while evading its spirit. 256 To an extent, creative compliance is
unobjectionable, as when structuring a business combination to avoid triggering
shareholder voting or appraisal rights or designing a lease to obtain capital treatment.
When done overzealously, as during the Enron era, the practice of creative compliance is
treacherous. Either way, however, law cannot do anything to punish compliance with
itself (nor can accounting). True, in corporate law equitable principles can police mere
technical compliance 257 and in securities regulation the broad-gauged anti-abuse
principles contribute. 258 But, in general, regulatory pursuit of creative compliance is
Quixotic—except perhaps through rhetoric. 259
Recognizing this, regulators turned to codes of business ethics. The SarbanesOxley Act required the SEC to promulgate rules requiring public disclosure of whether a
company has a code of ethics for senior officers and, if not, why not. 260 Companies must
promptly disclose changes to ethics codes, including waivers. The New York Stock
Exchange contemporaneously imposed a requirement that listed companies adopt and
disclose a code of business conduct and ethics. 261 The US Sentencing Guidelines were
amended in 2004 to take express account of whether an enterprise promoted business
ethics, including through adoption of formal codes. 262
The resulting codes of ethics are fascinating: they are all brief, abstract, simple
and similar, often emphasizing adherence to the “spirit of laws.” 263 The codes may be
truly “principles-based”—they are vague and contain barely a trace of “rules.” 264 While
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Why this is so requires speculation and competing explanations seem plausible, as neither SarbanesOxley nor related SEC regulations give specific guidance or requirements. On the one hand, the codes are
textual embodiments of aspirational corporate culture and thus would not likely contain detailed rules; on
the other, companies must promptly disclose waivers of ethics codes, some of which likely will be
53

promulgators of law and accounting cannot create principles-based systems, using that
vocabulary can reinforce the lessons in the codes. This interpretation of the rhetoric as
emphasizing ethical principles also explains frequent talk among regulators and
politicians of the need to fight “check-the-box” mentalities. 265
2. Qualifications — The ethical hypothesis to explain the rise of principles-based
rhetoric seems credible, but two qualifications are in order, one descriptive and one
normative. Descriptively, such a call to ethical rejuvenation implicitly assumes a decline
in ethics during the relevant period. Such periodic laments recur in history, and there is
limited basis for believing that a golden age of high ethics marked earlier periods. 266
This is almost certainly so in the case of corporate, securities and accounting matters.
While thoughtful scholars conclude that the Enron era exhibited a decline in business
ethics, 267 it seems impossible to reach firm conclusions about that.
Normatively, this strategy of emphasizing principles in law and accounting could
backfire. Ethics code exhortations to abide the spirit of laws—a call to principles that can
curtail creative compliance—project a moral appeal that may be desirable. But for
leaders to couple such codes with rhetorical stories of principles-based systems could
generate false confidence that resulting law or accounting will cure the disease. The
temptation, implicit in the celebration of principles-based systems, is to imagine that rules
should be eliminated. My analysis suggests that this is neither possible nor wise.
C. Political
A third possible explanation for rhetoric championing principles-based legal or
accounting systems is political. Descriptively, this seems to be a stronger explanation for
the prevalent campaign for principles-based systems compared to the regulatory and
ethical hypotheses. Normatively, it is the most troubling of the three hypotheses—and
uncomfortable to explain and broad general statements will minimize the frequency of waivers that must be
disclosed.
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the most cynical, although it is not idiosyncratic. 268 Prescriptively, it contributes to
debate concerning the merits of jurisdictional competition by raising questions not
previously addressed in that literature.
The literature on the jurisdictional competition debate, which spans across
numerous legal and other fields, is particularly robust in the contexts that this Article
addresses of corporate law, securities regulation and accounting. Contested topics
include whether competition exists, on what terms, and how to assess the results. The
following discussion of recent political jockeying supports the view that competition
exists among the actors in these contexts. Ensuing discussion explains how these
observations contribute one new reason to question the efficacy of jurisdictional
competition when the risk of rhetorical overstatement is significant.
1. Jurisdictional Competition — The following discussion considers how the
principles-based rhetoric may be explained in terms of competition among (a) Delaware
and Washington, D.C. in US corporate law, (b) British Columbia and Ontario in
Canadian securities regulation, (c) international accounting promulgators and the
SEC/FASB and (d) various countries in a more general geopolitical context.
a. Delaware versus Washington D.C. The jurisdictional competition debate was
particularly vigorous concerning the production of state corporation law in the US. 269
Participants mostly now agree that, while there may have been some form of competition
among states decades ago, that race largely is over and no or little current competition
exists. 270 Delaware prevailed. The literature has turned attention to a race of a different
sort, replacing the horizontal competition among states with a vertical competition
between Delaware and Washington, D.C. 271
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In the new competition, Delaware corporate lawyers, including judges, fight a
political battle with Washington for hegemony in the production of US corporate
governance law. 272 While this battle has endured for decades, 273 serving as the fallback
position to claims that state competition yields undesirable results, the stakes have risen
since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act when Washington preempted numerous areas of
corporate law traditionally handled by states. Since provisions of that Act were widely
lambasted as rules-based, a competitive political response would distinguish Delaware’s
corporate law as principles-based. 274
Playing a leading role in this contest, Delaware’s judges are unusual among
courts, in at least the following ways that support the political hypothesis. 275 Delaware
judges frequently write articles that are published in law reviews. 276 While some of these
provide thoughtful analysis and reflection, in recent installations, the articles are
increasingly promotional of the Delaware judiciary’s expertise, 277 extol the virtues of
Delaware corporate law (including the claim that it is “principles-based”) 278 and harshly
contrast those virtues with the vices of federal securities regulation (making their claim
that it is “rules-based” seem reserved by comparison). 279 In at least some Delaware
judicial opinions released since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, analysis shows that
the courts are attempting to respond to the political and competitive climate that
resulted. 280
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These developments reflect a different tenor of competition in the vertical sphere
between Delaware and Washington than obtained under the horizontal competition with
other states. The horizontal competition among states, such as Delaware and New York,
involved products that are substitutes. The competition hinged on the substantive
products. Losses in the competition were not devastating, with some would-be Delaware
customers simply choosing New York.
The vertical competition between Delaware and Washington does not involve
substitutes but products akin to bundled goods: a US corporation wishing to be public
must both be incorporated in a state and registered with the SEC. The stakes for
Delaware in this vertical competition are considerably higher than in the horizontal
competition because Washington can preempt Delaware. That means Delaware’s leaders
have stronger incentives to become not only entrepreneurs but a sales force.281 This may
help to explain the increasing exuberance that Delaware judges show in boasting of their
state’s products. In this competition, the SEC has lesser incentives to respond and, in any
event, its ability to stake positions is constrained by limitations of the Data Quality Act
that prevent it from engaging in the rhetorical overstatement that characterizes the
Delaware courts. 282
b. British Columbia versus Ontario. Unlike in the US, Canada lacks a central
authority in securities regulation such as the SEC. Instead, laws are promulgated by the
13 provinces and territories and enforced by commissions and tribunals of the respective
regions. 283 Each province uses governmental securities commissions or administrators to
oversee respective provincial securities laws. The provinces may compete in these terms
but not quite in the way that US states competed for charters. There are no charters to
fight over but provinces contend for leadership in designing the regulatory system, power
to promulgate and enforce law, and contribute to the national market system.
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Provincial autonomy is threatened by ongoing efforts to promote national
consistency and harmonization of securities regulation across Canada. 284 Provincial
securities commissions and administrators recently formed a national group, called the
Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) to provide a coordinating function. Current
forces are strong in favor of moving Canada from its existing fragmented structure to a
federal system with a single national regulator. This struggle implicates the balance of
power between the provincial and central governments and among the provinces.
Some provinces, including British Columbia, resist the centralized model because
of fear that it will be dominated by Ontario, the money-center province that is seen as
inclined to follow the US and its allegedly rules-based securities regulation. The British
Columbia principles-based securities regulation proposal can be seen as a political gambit
to resist that power. Ontario’s Securities Commission replied with a blistering comment
letter which, 285 while substantively meritorious, likewise has overtones of a political
response. 286
c. US versus International Accounting. Some form of competition has existed for
years between the SEC/FASB and IFRS promulgators. 287 The SEC historically provided
international leadership on accounting matters, filling the lacuna that exists in the
international arena which lacks a centralized power. 288 In this leadership, the SEC both
bears the costs of international regime formation and places its cultural imprint on the
process and results. In accounting, the SEC and FASB use unilateral and bilateral
diplomacy and pressure to influence promulgators of alternative accounting systems in a
process in which the SEC exerts and succumbs to political pressures. 289
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Promulgators of IFRS have been a potent political force in these engagements and
are an increasingly credible and influential competitor to FASB. The SEC nurtured this
role by initially insisting that IFRS adhere to criteria that the SEC established. The
SEC’s strategy was competitive: designed as “a surrogate investigation of the prevailing
culture of the [IFRS promulgators].” 290 IFRS promulgators responded by developing a
robust accounting system, with one eye on those criteria and another on the substantive
merits of particular provisions. In the process, they developed not only a system that the
SEC takes seriously but one that constitutes a credible rival to US GAAP. Ultimately,
these competitive political realities pressure the SEC to accept IFRS. 291 In this climate,
the SEC has pushed increasingly for convergence, not divergence. 292
This background sets the stage for a political account of prevailing rhetoric, which
operates at two levels of competition between IFRS and US GAAP. A primary
competition involves products that can be seen as substitutes: large multinational
corporations may choose which system to treat as their primary means of financial
reporting. To that extent, the promulgators compete by offering substantive alternatives
from which companies can choose. The secondary competition arises from how
consumers choosing US GAAP are assured that countries worldwide will accept their
financial statements as complying with minimum standards whereas, at present, IFRS is
not so widely recognized. As a result, large corporations throughout the world use US
GAAP or face investor pressure to do so, giving the SEC and FASB dominion. 293
IFRS must achieve more power both to attract new customers in the primary
competition and to influence ongoing articulation of accounting provisions of the SEC
and FASB in the secondary competition. It must both offer a different product and
persuade consumers—and other regulators—that its product is superior. Helpful to doing
so is denominating US GAAP as rules-based—and denigrating such an approach—while
describing IFRS as principles-based. The SEC and FASB return the volley either by
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explaining their version of a principles-based system (the objectives-oriented model) or
claiming that US GAAP is principles-based too. 294
d. Other Countries. Other countries may take up the principles-based banner as a
result of broader geopolitical realities. First, principles-based sloganeering may reflect
efforts to signal mature rather than developing country status. The self-enforcing model
of corporate law designed by Professors Black and Kraakman makes the case for rules in
corporate laws of emerging economies. 295 US governmental representatives make
similar cases concerning securities regulation to countries such as China. 296 It would be
unsurprising if countries publicized having principles-based legal and accounting systems
to signal maturity beyond the rules-based stage of development.
Second, the label “rules-based” is used in national economic policy to designate
things like fixed exchange rates, interest rate adjustments and budgeting policy (such as
the rule against government borrowing to pay current costs but only to make
investments). 297 In contrast are “discretionary policies,” flexible fiscal and monetary
tools to influence economic demand and smooth business cycle vicissitudes. The
International Monetary Fund and World Bank strongly favor rules, especially for
emerging economies. 298 But individual countries like discretionary policies to retain
autonomy. When rules are imposed on emerging economies, it would be unsurprising for
countries to join a bandwagon boasting that they offer principles-based systems.
2. Limitations — If reports of principles-based systems are intended to
distinguish legal/accounting products, the impossibility of offering such products makes
the reports misleading. This by-product of jurisdictional competition is not explicitly
addressed in prevalent debates concerning the merits of this phenomenon in corporate
law, securities regulation or accounting. But if jurisdictional competition can produce
misleading rhetoric, it is possible that the otherwise virtuous process of competition
among regulators is impaired.
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The jurisdictional competition model is contested but, when its assumptions
obtain, the model is plausible enough. The model, as applied to corporate law, securities
regulation and accounting, envisions regulators as producers of goods and investors as
consumers. 299 The model is appealing when a large number of producers offer a
complete range of goods and consumers command perfect information about offerings
and can switch between them with little cost. 300 Both visions require that perfect
information about products be available to investors and understood accurately by them,
plausible to the same extent that relatively efficient capital markets are plausible. 301
But misleading regulatory characterizations weaken the information-based
assumptions of the jurisdictional competition model. Ordinarily, imperfect information is
ameliorated by intermediaries who charge fees to “channel information to consumers.” 302
For example, in the state corporation charter competition story, customers used corporate
They and
lawyers to provide truthful objective assessments of the alternatives. 303
securities lawyers and accountants can serve like functions within their respective
specialties in the current competitions.
Yet regulatory misstatement diminishes expert ability to filter information
effectively. Indeed, especially in a competitive climate, many professionals have stakes
in the outcome, as where Delaware lawyers or IFRS-trained accountants have incentives
to echo official regulatory pronouncements. Rhetorical overstatement also makes it more
difficult for professionals to communicate information effectively to clients who are led,
through public statements, to believe the rhetoric. There are limited mechanisms to
constrain or filter regulatory misstatements. While the SEC is subject to the Data Quality
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Act limitations that command regulatory accuracy, promulgators of IFRS, Delaware and
British Columbia are not. 304
Regulatory mischaracterization is a problem for all philosophical dispositions
implicated in debates over jurisdictional competition. Proponents assume that
government actors exhibit business-like integrity; public interest theory views
government as benevolent; and even public choice theory portrays government as
responsive to private rent-seeking. Each of these accounts changes if regulatory
competitors are susceptible to the same kinds of weaknesses of misleading statements
that traditional business enterprises can engage in. Integrity, benevolence and
responsiveness are impaired. Thus, jurisdictional competition debate may hinge, in part,
on philosophical views concerning relative confidence in markets versus governments to
promote social ends. 305 But this analysis adds a limitation to its efficacy when
sloganeering is misleading and neither consumers nor their professional advisors can be
counted upon to pierce it.
The additional argument does not mean that jurisdictional competition is never
preferred. Rather, it means that the presence or risk of regulatory overstatement is a
factor which deserves explicit recognition in the assessment. It appears to exist in the
three specific contexts considered, making this a factor against unbridled jurisdictional
competition in these contexts. It is uncertain whether that means that superior results
would follow from alternatives to jurisdictional competition, such as harmonization.
What is certain is the prudence of questioning the rhetoric invoking rules-based and
principles-based systems.
CONCLUSION
Rules and principles are imperfect categories to describe individual legal or
accounting provisions. While some provisions may fit neatly into such categories,
rational systems of law or accounting partake of both types and hybrids running across a
continuum. Even when it is possible to classify individual provisions as rules or
principles, fairly characterizing entire systems as rules-based or principles-based is an
essentially impossible task. In addition to examining all the individual provisions within
the system, one would have to account for how they are applied and how they interact.
Once those stages of a system are accounted for, and the benefits appreciated, it is
difficult to conclude that any system of corporate law, securities regulation or accounting
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systems can be rules-based or principles-based. Surveys of these fields warrant
skepticism about the accuracy of such descriptive claims.
Why global rhetoric championing principles-based systems is flourishing
requires speculation. The phenomenon is possibly due to a combination of regulatory
desire to provide a counterweight to demand for rules, a quest to rejuvenate ethics and a
desire to distinguish a jurisdiction’s legal-financial products. The first and second
explanations seem credible and largely benign, although they pose some risk of
backfiring if regulators become overzealous. The third seems most descriptively accurate
but also most normatively troubling. If it is infeasible to establish a principles-based
system of corporate law, securities regulation or accounting, then it is misleading to
promote the possibility. Accordingly, the labels should be retired and regulators who use
them greeted with skepticism that they are operating under unfortunate by-products of
jurisdictional competition.
Another way of concluding this analysis is to observe that the rhetoric of “rulesbased” versus “principles-based” as descriptions of complex regulatory systems is an
instance of the common political habit of invoking binary classifications. Examples
appearing in certain styles of political discourse include the stunningly oversimplified
labels of “the right” and “the left” or use of the phrase “both sides of the debate” when
reducing complex disagreements to oversimplified binaries (as in “both sides of the
rationality debate” or “both sides of the Iraq War debate”). Political realities and
positional complexities expose such labels as contextually false dichotomies.
Unreflective invocation of binary labels in policy discourse retards rather than advances
thoughtful dialogue. In the case of binary classifications of complex regulatory systems,
this impairs weighing the relative advantages of using various forms of provisions to
achieve varying objectives.
If so, then it would be appealing to allow the simple labels to represent extreme
ends of a spectrum, so that complex regulatory systems could range across a spectrum
denominated at its poles by extreme principles-density to extreme rules-density. A
classificatory scheme could be constructed in which systems are located at descriptive
positions across that spectrum. Descriptive locations could include some terms suggested
above, such as principles-heavy, principles-rich, rules-rich and rules-heavy. 306 A
challenge in devising such a descriptive spectrum, however, is that to establish such
locations still requires highly-sophisticated classification and measurement tools that
have not been developed (involving sorting individual provisions into notoriously
unstable categories plus then accounting for how the individual provisions are applied
and how they interact).
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On the other hand, if it were possible to develop a reliable classification and
measurement method to support such descriptive classifications, the refined taxonomy
could be appealing. It would displace the false binary. That offers the advantage of
faithfully reflecting the realities that individual provisions reside along a rules-principles
continuum that is sometimes unruly and that complex regulatory systems exhibit relative
vagueness with even more systemic unruliness. So reflecting those realities in the
discourse would rightly neutralize the rhetorical and political power of the false binary.
That could improve capabilities in weighing the relative appeal of various forms of
provisions in relation to objectives. The inherent limitations of a quest to do so likely
would lead to the more ultimate prescription made in this Article, through a fizzling out
of the vocabulary altogether.
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